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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Research Rationale 
 
The UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF), announced by the UK Government in June 
2009, is a venture capital fund of funds that aims to drive economic growth and create 
highly skilled jobs by investing in innovative businesses where there are significant growth 
opportunities.  The UKIIF attempts to mark a step change in the UK venture capital (VC) 
market by establishing a substantial fund of funds that will replicate the best US funds by 
making investments at all business stages, with the market scale that can build companies 
with global reach.  The underlying funds within the UKIIF fund of funds will invest in 
technology based businesses in strategically important sectors to the UK including digital 
technologies, life sciences1, clean technology2 and advanced manufacturing.  
This research provides an early assessment of the lessons learned in implementing and 
delivering the UKIIF ahead of the main evaluation and provides early indications of the 
extent to which it is addressing market failures in the UK VC market and contributing to 
business growth. 
 
Key Research Aims: 
 
 To contextualise the wider market conditions in which the UKIIF was set up and wider 
role of the scheme within the UK and European VC market. 
 To characterise recipient firms’ growth stage, products, innovation and exports. 
 To assess financial additionality, estimate deadweight and leverage.  
 To examine the ‘customer journey’ and satisfaction with the scheme.  
 To assess emerging impacts of the funding on business performance.  
 To examine the existence of any emerging innovation spill over effects.  
 To consider the UKIIF’s role for supporting life sciences and low carbon sectors. 
 
Methodology 
An early stage assessment of the likely economic effectiveness of the UKIIF was made 
through in-depth structured face to face and extended telephone interviews with 16 
business recipients, two fund of fund managers, six underlying fund managers and two 
market stakeholders. Further evaluations will be carried out at approximately five to seven 
years after the Funds started investing and a final evaluation once the funds have been 
fully divested and closed.  These findings should therefore be viewed as providing a 
possible indication of impact of the scheme, rather than a definitive assessment. 
                                            
1 Life Sciences includes: pharma-biotech, diagnostics, medical devices and other healthcare-related technologies. 
4 
2 Clean technology ‘low carbon’ activity is defined as, “Technologies, products and processes which increase or are intended to 
increase energy efficiency and/or reduce or limit the emission of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride) or the use of processes which emit greenhouse gases, including but 
not limited to sources of renewable energy” 
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Wider Market Conditions 
There is considerable evidence (NESTA, 2008, 2009) that early stage equity finance has 
become more difficult for technology based businesses to obtain in the current financial 
crisis, post 2008, particularly for intensive longer term R&D investment ranging from 
£250,000 up to £10m (Ullah et al. 2011).  With VC investment down considerably across 
Europe and the US from the peak of 2006 (NESTA, 2011; BVCA, 2010), there was and 
still is a need for a large–scale pan European source of funding for high growth potential 
businesses, stimulated by public investment, as well as a reduction in tax and financial 
trading barriers (EU, 2011). A key feature of the UKIIF is that it is managed by private 
sector VC fund experts, which helps optimise investment decisions (Murray, 2009). Within 
this context the UKIIF provides a potential model for further large scale public assisted VC 
funds across Europe (e.g. with specific sectoral specialisms, or targeting particular groups 
of countries).  
 
UKIIF Fund Structure 
The UK Government has invested £150 million to corner stone the creation of the UKIIF, 
with the objective of matching private sector sources of funding. This has been exceeded 
with £180 million raised from private investors, providing the UKIIF with £330 million to 
invest at final closing. 
UKIIF operates as two funds of funds investing UK government funds pari passu with other 
private investors into selected underlying specialist VC funds in the UK and Europe.  
 
The Hermes Environmental Innovation Fund has a closure value of £130m, consisting of 
£50m UK government and £80m of private investment and focuses on efficient use of 
resources and clean technologies for a low carbon economy.   
 
The European Investment Fund's UK Future Technologies Fund has a closure value of 
£200m, consisting of £100m UK government investment and £100m of European 
Investment Bank investment, and focuses on life sciences, digital technology and 
advanced manufacturing sectors.  
 
Key Findings 
 
The role of UKIIF 
UKIIF is seen as strongly addressing the gap in the supply of equity finance in 2009 
and is still required today, as few private sector UK institutions focus on VC market 
investment. 
 
Consultees expressed the view that Government funding of technology businesses should 
continue. This will help encourage further financial institution investment in these new 
businesses, rather than financing asset rich businesses.  
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A key area for business funding is at the £2-5m level, above the existing EU state aid limit 
and therefore above the funding level of the UK government’s Enterprise Capital Funds 
(ECFs) which target the equity gap. 
 
The UKIIF has had a positive influence on encouraging greater private investment, 
particularly in specialist technology funds. This has helped to overcome historic tainting 
from poor financial returns in the UK early investment market, denominator effects (where 
institutions reduce their investment in VC in line with the falling value of their investments 
in quoted equities, so that they maintain the proportion of VC investment in their portfolio), 
concerns in the Euro zone which increase uncertainty and discourage investment in high 
risk asset classes like VC and shortage of investment in high risk technology innovation. 
 
However, some stakeholders expressed concerns over the speed at which UKIIF was set-
up, which may not have allowed as much private investment as might have been possible 
if a longer time period had been allowed. The fund was set up relatively quickly to address 
the large decline in the availability of venture capital during the credit crunch.  
 
Successful recipient businesses accessed the UKIIF largely depending on the credibility 
and strength of their business plan and management team, previous experience with VCs, 
sector and stage of development. They indicated that there is current interest in investing 
within the energy and social communications/IT sectors and later stage R&D finance when 
the technology platform is tradable.  
 
Overall, recipient businesses suggested that it is harder since the onset of the economic 
downturn (since 2007) to get start-up and early stage R&D finance, with lower valuations 
and lengthening timescales to finding and negotiating for finance, with some suggesting 
this process has doubled from 6 to 12 months, with much more comprehensive due 
diligence required. 
 
The UKIIF model 
Through a fund of funds model, UKIIF has successfully encouraged additional 
private investment leverage and investment diversification.  
 
Private funding leverage has been achieved through the use of professional fund of funds 
managers with access to funding and strategic performance oversight. This has attracted a 
wide range of investors, including financial institutions, corporate investors, banks, other 
government funds, HNW individuals and family offices.  This assessment estimates that 
current overall leverage at fund level of the UKIIF public to private investment is around 20 
times, which is significant in the current fund raising climate. Four of the six interviewed 
fund managers received UKIIF investments after first close, so the fund would have 
existed without the UKIIF investment. However three of these fund managers considered 
that their funds would not have been as large at final close without the endorsement of and 
introductions provided by the fund of funds manager. It is also notable that all of the 
investments after first close were made in 2010, often with funds known to the fund of 
funds managers before UKIIF was established. The first close investments are all in the 
second half of 2011. It is therefore considered too early to accurately assess the full 
leverage impact of UKIIF investments. 
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A key challenge of the fund of funds model including the UKIIF is the double layer of fee 
costs (underlying fund and fund of funds manager fees) and also less direct investor 
influence at the underlying fund level. 
 
The UKIIF investment covers a range of underlying funds from seed/start-up (e.g. Advent) 
to established growth companies (e.g. Zouk).    
 
Underlying fund managers report that the UKIIF is not affecting underlying fund investment 
strategy, except for targets on the amount of UK funding (e.g. £150m total investment, 
£25m clean tech, £25m life sciences which reflect the investment contribution of the UK 
Government and specific Department contributions), but funds expect to surpass these 
anyway. 
 
Recipient firm characteristics  
 
UKIIF appears to be focusing on early stage businesses requiring finance for R&D 
in key sectors 
 
As part of this research 16 UKIIF recipient businesses were surveyed: 10 from Hermes 
Environmental Innovation Fund and 7 from EIF UKFTF (one business received funding 
from both), across 5 underlying funds: WHEB, SEP, Zouk (HERMES funds); Advent and 
DFJ (EIF funds). They include 13 UK owned/based businesses. 
 
All the surveyed UKIIF recipient businesses are in the target sectors (but there is some 
multiple sector overlap): 9 clean technology (including 7 Energy and 4 recycling), 6 
Communications/IT, 3 Life sciences, and 3 Advanced Manufacturing. Fund of funds 
investments into specialist underlying private VC funds in the UK and Europe appears to 
be working well, with recipient businesses recognising these underlying funds as being 
market leaders and actively wanting investment from these funds.     
 
UKIIF appears to be focusing on early stage R&D investment. The surveyed businesses 
included 5 start-up businesses, 4 early R&D stage, 4 later R&D stage, and 3 established 
venture projects. Established venture investments were into early stage R&D in companies 
seeking step change development through R&D commercialisation into new markets3.  
 
Customer journey and satisfaction  
 
Recipient businesses typically found the UKIIF underlying fund through managers 
experienced in working with VCs, or by using professional VC finders and describe 
the underlying fund as their ‘first’ and ‘natural choice’ of investor.   
 
Although the UKIIF operates as two funds of funds which invest in underlying VC funds 
and is slightly removed from investee companies, it is helpful to understand how SMEs 
have accessed investment from the underlying funds.  
                                            
7 
3 These definitions accord with BVCA (2010) investment stage definitions: ‘seed’ refers to developing the business 
concept; ‘start-up’ refers to product development and initial marketing; ‘early stage’ refers to moving to initial 
commercialisation; ‘later stage’ refers to developing commercialisation into profitability; ‘expansion’ refers to 
established ventures developing new products. 
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Underlying funds are promoted through specialist networks, fund reputation, conferences, 
events and websites, with reliance on fund reputation and referrals from advisors. 
Underlying funds each receive between 500-600 proposals per annum of which between 
0.5 and 2 per cent received funding. 
 
Recipients found underlying funds through their own experienced managers, specialist VC 
finders and referrals. 
 
Recipient businesses primarily selected the underlying fund for its fund manager expertise 
(7), sectoral specialism (6) and in many cases described it as the ‘first’ and ‘natural choice’ 
for investment. There was no perception of additional ‘red tape’ associated with 
government schemes under the UKIIF model. 
 
The average time to prepare, search and obtain UKIIF funding was 9 months: 4 months to 
prepare and find; 5 months for due diligence and negotiations. This is in-line with private 
sector VC funding in general in the UK. 
 
The underlying fund managers not only provided benefits from the financial investment but 
also added considerable value through Non Executive Director (NED) input, recruiting key 
managers, sourcing consultants, finding and negotiating with customers, improving 
business management control systems, and generally ‘driving’ business growth.  
 
Recipient businesses reported very high satisfaction rates with 88 per cent rating the 
underlying fund as very good and 94 per cent definitely recommending it to other 
businesses in their situation. 
 
Assessment of financial additionality, deadweight and leverage  
 
UKIIF appears to be providing additional finance to businesses, and offers 
advantages over alternative funding sources 
 
The 16 surveyed businesses received £46.7m of UKIIF funding through an equity stake in 
their business, and this funding represented just under half (47 per cent) of overall project 
cost and leveraged £25.2m of attributable additional finance from other finance providers 
e.g. banks and other VC funds (55 per cent of UKIIF funding)4.  
 
In the absence of the UKIIF, less than one fifth (3) would have found finance and 
proceeded with projects at the same time and scale (Deadweight). The remainder (13) 
would have been smaller scale (9), taken longer (7), or not gone ahead (1).  Alternative 
finance in all cases would have compromised growth, either through delays, or lack of 
suitability of alternative finance. This shows that the fund has (partial) additionality, which 
is also enabling additional economic benefits to occur sooner than might be the case in the 
absence of the fund. This might assist first mover advantage in rapidly developing new 
technologies, but is also contributing to higher quality innovation and improved solutions to 
the market.   
                                            
8 
4 The UKIIF underlying fund was typically the lead investor and only in one case was it levered in by another VC. This 
case has not been included as attributable leveraged additional finance. 
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Supply-side respondents noted that the UKIIF is not seen as duplicating any existing UK 
government policies. 
 
Emerging impacts of UKIIF on business performance  
 
Although it is too soon to make a robust assessment of actual business 
performance, initial evidence suggests that the UKIIF’s likely overall impact on 
business development appears greater than its investment level. 
 
Two thirds (11) of recipients attribute over three quarters of improved performance to the 
UKIIF (for two-thirds UKIIF was under half of project cost). 
 
Employment in UKIIF recipient businesses is forecast to increase over three fold within 
three years of receiving funding (from 35 to 132 employees per average firm).  Turnover in 
UKIIF recipient businesses is expected to increase three fold within three years of 
receiving funding (from £13m to around £40m per average firm). 
 
At least four fifths of UK owned recipient businesses will export within the next three years, 
with exports representing over half of sales turnover for half of these businesses. 
 
Emerging innovation spill over effects  
 
All surveyed UKIIF recipient businesses are currently developing highly innovative 
products/services.  
 
All surveyed recipient businesses are currently developing highly innovative 
products/services which are likely to benefit the UK economy and half have products that 
are potential global leaders, whilst others expect them to become so.  
 
UKIIF benefits the UK university and R&D base and entrepreneurial culture, with 
innovation closely linked to external collaborations and spin outs from R&D specialists, 
acquisitions and universities, through KTPs5 and FP76.  
 
Since there are few competitors, the UKIIF businesses trading in the UK appear to be 
offering complementary products and services that should not directly displace existing 
activity. 
 
UKIIF’s support for life sciences and a low carbon economy 
 
UKIIF is supporting life science and clean technology businesses in the UK 
 
In line with the objectives of the fund of targeting life science and clean technology 
businesses, around two thirds of surveyed UKIIF recipient businesses (11) will reduce 
carbon use and costs through the products or services developed, with half (7) saving 
                                            
5 UK government funded Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) between universities and industry. 
9 
6 European Union Seventh Framework (FP7) grant funding for research and innovation to create jobs and growth. 
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energy, one quarter improving recycling and one quarter improving health. Seven 
businesses currently trading in the UK are all offering totally new, innovative services and 
products, providing efficiencies in time and energy.  
 
UKIIF Fund Performance 
 
It is too soon to assess fund financial performance 
 
It is currently too early to assess fund financial performance, although in line with the 
objectives of the fund, fund managers are aiming for high financial returns. However, full 
realisation is not likely to occur until well beyond 2020 (up to 12 years on from fund 
closure).  The 16 UKIIF recipient businesses’ fund exit timescale ranged from 1-7 years, 
averaging 4 years. 
 
There are some concerns from recipient business managers relating to keeping their 
businesses within the UK, since trade and corporate/institutional VC investors at future 
funding rounds are likely to come from abroad. 
 
Concerns were also expressed by underlying fund managers about changes in 
Government policy on environmental subsidies and tax reliefs and the uncertainty this has 
caused for investors active in clean technologies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Rationale 
The UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) was announced by the UK government in 
June 2009, to provide long term support to the venture capital (VC) market to finance 
innovative high growth potential businesses. This research is an early in-depth 
assessment of business recipients, fund of fund managers, fund managers and key market 
stakeholders. It provides an early assessment of the lessons learned in implementing and 
delivering the UKIIF and early indications of the extent to which it is meeting UK market 
demand and contributing to business productivity and growth, in advance of a 
comprehensive evaluation to be undertaken at a later stage. 
1.2 Key Research Aims: 
 To contextualise the wider market conditions in which the UKIIF was set up and wider 
role of the scheme within the UK and European VC market. 
 
 To characterise recipient firms’ growth stage, products, innovation and exports. 
 
 To assess financial additionality, estimate deadweight and leverage.  
 
 To examine the ‘customer journey’ and satisfaction with the scheme.  
 
 To assess emerging impacts of the funding on business performance.  
 
 To examine the existence of any emerging innovation spill over effects.  
 
 To consider the UKIIF’s role for supporting life sciences and low carbon sectors. 
 
1.3 The Economic and Policy Context 
Whilst various large scale surveys demonstrate that few (under two per cent) SMEs seek 
equity finance compared with those seeking debt finance (Fraser 2005; CBR, 2008; ASBS, 
2010), obtaining equity finance is an important source of funding to many new and existing 
technology and knowledge based enterprises who are growth orientated (Ullah et al., 
2011). These businesses face information asymmetries (Schmid, 2001) due to the 
complexities of their business propositions, as well as barriers due to perceived high risk, 
long payback period and relatively high transaction costs (especially in relation to the lack 
of availability of smaller scale equity venture capital funding).  
 
Prior to the 2008 credit crunch, there was already evidence of equity funding gaps, 
particularly in seed finance (Mason and Harrison, 2004) and early stage development 
finance at beyond the scale of angel investors and syndicates but below the level at which 
private sector VCs can cost effectively operate; i.e. £250,000 to £2 million (NESTA, 2008). 
11 
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SQW (2009) found that that the parameters of the equity gap stretch from £250,000 to at 
least £2 million for the vast majority of businesses, with some stakeholders believing that 
the upper boundary had expanded to at least £5 million in recent years. However, for 
sectors requiring complex R&D or large capital expenditure (for instance, clean tech or bio 
science), it could be as high as £15 million. 
The UK government has addressed these perceived market failures creating an equity gap 
by offering Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) tax incentives to private investors and 
introducing public sector initiatives concerned with creating joint public/private financed 
venture capital funds (Murray, 2007), including Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) to provide 
public funded equity up to the EU state aid limit of £2 million (BIS, 2010). 
In addition to the long standing market failure in the provision of risk capital there was 
clear evidence that SMEs were being impacted by the slowdown in the economy. 
Although the availability of both bank and risk capital finance was becoming more difficult 
for all SMEs, there was particularly concern for innovative businesses that are perceived 
to be both higher risk and less able to weather current turbulence in global markets. 
There was growing evidence suggesting a failure in the UK ‘finance escalator’ (Mason 
2010; Gill 2010), particular relating to access to equity finance. Reduction in the levels of 
private investment finance in the UK market (BVCA, 2010), linked with blockages in 
private angel and VC sales (Mason, 2010; NESTA, 2011) locking angels into follow-on 
investments (CEEDR/Sanders Thomas Ltd, 2009) at the same time as a shift of VC 
finance into follow-on and less risky later stage investments, have led to three distinctive 
equity finance gaps: (i) initial seed finance; (ii) early stage development (Glancey 
Johnson, 2009); and (iii) the growing equity gap at beyond the £2 million level, rising to 
as high as £10 million (SQW, 2009; BIS, 2010) for more risky intensive R&D longer term 
investments (5-10 years) for bio/life sciences, clean technologies, digital technologies 
and advanced manufacturing activities. 
The fall in the supply of equity finance during the recession is shown by BVCA data.  
Between 2007 and 2010, there was a 21% decline by value of investment.7 
 
                                            
12 
7 It is important to note that in 2010 BVCA revised the methodology for estimating the venture capital activity of its members, which 
also changed the previous 2009 and 2008 figures as well.  The graph shows the estimates using the current methodology.  Under 
previous methodology, there was a 29% point decrease in number (47% point decrease by value) between 2007 and 2009, which 
provided strong justification for intervention in the venture capital market. 
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Figure 1.1: Value of UK VC (£m) funded per year by BVCA members 
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The National Audit Office (2009) review of venture capital support to small businesses 
revealed a number of key difficulties facing public assisted VC programmes, notably with 
regard to Regional VC funds. These included:  
 The need for a flow of good quality deals 
 The timing of investments 
 The need for broad geographic coverage  
 The need for larger fund sizes, with the ability to make follow-on investments 
 That the Government (tax payers) investment should be on an equal footing to that 
of the private investor (e.g. equal protection and return) 
 Ability to exit investments at an appropriate time 
 Fund management is expensive, but can add value to the businesses via 
management assistance 
 The cycle of return on investment, estimated initially at 10-12 years, is likely to be 
greater due to the economic downturn.   
Included in the NAO (2009) review was the UK High Technology Fund (UKHTF) that was 
established in 2000 as a fund of funds with £20m government commitment and no limit on 
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investment. The fund was specifically designed to demonstrate to investors that 
commercial returns can be made from early stage, high technology investments. The 
UKHTF’s diversification of investment through a fund of funds model proved attractive and 
leveraged a five to one ratio of private to public investment. However, NAO reported the 
financial returns on the fund were below those of comparable high technology European 
investment funds, which collectively operate on a much larger scale.  
 
1.4 The Role of UKIIF 
With the long established weakness in the supply of venture capital to innovative SMEs, 
and emerging evidence of deterioration in the supply of venture capital, the Government 
announced the establishment of the UKIIF in 2009, with £150 million of government 
investment. 
 
UKIIF aims to provide an additional boost for high-growth, high-tech businesses struggling 
to raise equity finance during current economic conditions. The fund focuses on key life 
science, clean technologies and low carbon, digital technologies and advanced 
manufacturing sectors. UKIIF addresses the supply of equity in the UK VC market, 
specifically targeting equity finance at the potential growth sectors where intensive R&D is 
required and longer term investment cycles apply. Being pari passu, the fund is not bound 
by EU state aid limits, and the fund is able to make individual investments exceeding £2m. 
Previous studies (Ullah et al. 2011) suggest that these are likely to be in sectors which will 
experience most difficulties in obtaining sufficient equity finance for growth, particularly in 
the aftermath of the global credit crunch.   
 
UKIIF aims to apply the lessons from the past (NAO, 2009) and the relative success of the 
UKHTF, by providing an approach which has sufficient scale with £150m public funds 
invested pari passu on an equal footing with matched £180m private funds, UK-wide 
coverage and ability to invest overseas, potentially spreading fund risk and increasing 
returns. Since UKIIF is investing in leading private VC funds across Europe which 
specialise in its target sectors, there is an understanding that these VC funds are able to 
invest in overseas companies based in Europe (or with European ties), as well as UK 
owned and based companies. The only UK government guideline in this respect is that the 
overall UKIIF business investments in the UK amount to at least the £150m, the equivalent 
of the UK Government’s investment (45 per cent of the total UKIIF fund value of £330m), 
with targets of £25m each for Cleantech and Life Sciences investments.8   
   
It is important to note that UKIIF is two fund of funds and does not directly invest in 
businesses. It is managed by expert private sector fund of funds managers through the 
Hermes GPE Environmental Innovation Fund (£130m) and the European Investment Fund 
                                            
14 
8 Reflecting the financial contributions from DEACC and DOH. 
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(EIF) UK Future Technology Fund (£200m). These fund of funds invest specifically into 
innovation and technology funds targeting the key sectors: Hermes Environmental 
Innovation Fund invests into funds which target clean technologies and low carbon, whilst 
EIF UKFTF invests into funds targeting life sciences, digital and advanced manufacturing. 
Equity investments into businesses are made by the underlying funds purely on a 
commercial basis (with Hermes also co-investing directly alongside fund managers’ deals 
if the deals are in the UK), with no government influence. Importantly this market led 
approach is not bound by EU state aid regulations and can invest at above the £2 million 
level, providing follow-on investments where appropriate.   
 
1.5 UKIIF Structure 
The fund of funds managers are tasked with investing UK government funds pari passu 
with other public/private funding into specialist VC funds in the UK and Europe who invest 
in innovative high growth potential businesses. Table 1.1 details the fund of funds 
investments made by the end of 2011.  
 
The Hermes Environmental Innovation Fund (closed with a value of £130m; consisting of 
£50m UK government and £80m private funds) is focused on increasing the efficient use 
of resources and the development of clean technologies and is a major boost in the 
transition to a low carbon economy.  To date it has made investments into five private VC 
funds (see Table 1.1), with further ones expected in the future.   
 
The European Investment Fund's UK Future Technologies Fund (closed with a value of 
£200m; consisting of £100m UK government funds and £100m European Investment Bank 
funds) is focused on a number of specialist technology funds relating to life sciences, 
digital technology and advanced manufacturing.  To date, it has also made investments 
into five private VC funds (see Table 1.1) with further fund investments expected in the 
future.   
    
  Table 1.1: UKIIF Funds (End of 2011) 
Hermes GPE Environmental Innovation Fund 
WHEB Ventures II 
Zouk Cleantech Europe II 
Hg Renewable Power Partners II 
Scottish Equity Partners IV 
Scottish Equity Partners Environmental Energy Fund 
European Innovation Fund UK Future Technologies Fund 
DFJ Esprit III 
Action Heureka 
Advent Life Sciences 
Gilde Healthcare III 
Scottish Equity Partners IV 
15 
 
Early Assessment of the UK Innovation Investment Fund 
16 
 
 
1.6 European Context 
It is widely acknowledged that the European venture capital market lacks the scale and co-
ordination of the longer established US market (Murray, 2007; NESTA 2009, 2011). 
NESTA (2011) data drawn from Thomson One in the US and EVCA in Europe 
demonstrates that in 2010 the US based VC market invested $20 billion across all stages 
(seed, early, expansion and late), whilst European based VC market invested $5 billion 
and the UK based market invested $1 billion. In comparative terms US VC investments 
represented 0.14% of GDP whilst UK VC investments represented just 0.05% of GDP9.     
 
The European Commission (2011, p.5) has noted: “Today, raising funds for venture capital 
finance remains at sub-optimal levels…The relatively small sizes of European venture 
capital funds prevents the emergence of economies of scale … prerequisites for the 
specialisation necessary to operate successful venture capital funds.”  The argument 
presented is that structural issues undermine the European venture capital market, even in 
the UK and France where it is most established, which is needed to fund specialist 
innovation intensive R&D firms that can provide the growth and jobs for the future. The 
existence of transaction costs (Robb and Seamans, 2011) prevent investors gathering 
information and it is through the operations of larger scale financial intermediaries such as 
venture capitalists with specialist sectoral knowledge that an optimal level of funding for 
these firms can be achieved. Herriot (2011) also argues that venture capital success is 
founded on volume of trading, since few investments (typically less than 20 per cent, 
according to pareto law) yield significant financial returns.  
 
In an era of tight financial constraint (post 2008 credit crunch) when VC investment has 
been considerably down across Europe and the US from the peak of 2006 (NESTA, 2011; 
BVCA, 2010), there is support from policymakers (European Union Commission, 2011) 
and practitioners (Herriot, 2011) for a pan European approach, stimulated by public 
investment from the European Investment Bank (EIB), with corresponding reduction in tax 
and financial trading barriers and managed by private sector VC fund experts (Murray, 
2009). Within this context UKIIF provides one potential model for further large scale 
publicly assisted venture capital funds across Europe (e.g. with specific sectoral 
specialisms, or targeting particular groups of countries).    
                                            
9  2010 US GDP $14,658 trillion, UK GDP $2,247 trillion (nominal IMF data). Note it is difficult to make direct comparison as VC 
and private equity are separated in the US, not in the UK. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
This early assessment of UKIIF is predominately qualitative, with the aim of assessing the 
lessons learned from establishing the fund, the views of fund managers invested in 
through the UKIIF and the experiences of recipient investee businesses. The assessment 
consisted of four types of interview, undertaken either face to face or via extended 
telephone calls, involving: 
 
(i) Interviews with the 2 fund of funds managers at Hermes Environmental Innovation 
Fund and EIF’s UK Future Technologies Fund 
(ii) Interviews with 6 fund managers, three from Hermes investments and three from 
EIF investments  
(iii) Interviews by telephone with two trade associations; British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA) and European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) 
(iv) Interviews with 16 recipient investee businesses with five presented as more 
detailed case studies to provide specific examples.   
2.2 Selection of Surveyed Funds 
Selection of the funds for interview was agreed with BIS, based mainly on the criteria of 
those funds that had closed the earliest and had the longest period to invest at the time of 
interview, whilst also trying to achieve a range of funds specialising in different key sectors 
(e.g. clean technology/low carbon, life sciences, digital technologies and advanced 
manufacturing). Since there are also European based funds, it was also important to 
ensure that some of these were also represented. The majority of the fund manager 
interviews were undertaken face to face (Table 2.1). Additionally, surveyed fund managers 
were asked to provide supporting fund management data and the project team are grateful 
for assistance received from Capital for Enterprise Limited (CfEL), the arms length UK 
government organisation which oversees the operation of UKIIF (and other public funded 
equity/finance schemes).  
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Table 2.1: Selected Surveyed Funds and Interview Method 
 Fund Interview Method 
Hermes GPE Environmental Innovation Fund Face to face 
WHEB Ventures II 
Zouk Cleantech Europe II 
Scottish Equity Partners Environmental Energy Fund 
Face to face  
Face to face  
Face to face 
European Investment Fund UK Future Technologies Fund Telephone 
DFJ Esprit III 
Advent Life Sciences 
Gilde Healthcare III 
Face to face  
Face to face  
Telephone 
Note: Scottish Equity Partners (SEP) IV fund was also covered with the SEP EEF manager. 
2.3 Selection of Stakeholders 
Two stakeholder interviews were conducted with organisations representing UK and 
European private venture capitalists. The Chairman of the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA) was interviewed face to face, whilst the Head of External Relations at 
the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) was interviewed by telephone. 
2.4 Selection of Surveyed Businesses 
Selection of the recipient investee businesses was influenced by the level of investment 
activity in the selected interviewed funds at the time of the assessment. The aim was to 
obtain a wide range of recipients from the different sectors and stages of 
business/innovation development represented in the assisted group. These focus on new 
investments, but also include some follow-on investments within the fund portfolio after the 
injection of UKIIF investment. It was also suggested that since the UKIIF investment funds 
could invest in overseas businesses, that at least one example of an overseas investee 
firm be included. Eight of the sixteen interviews were undertaken face to face, with the 
remainder undertaken by extended telephone interview. The surveyed businesses were 
also asked to provide additional supporting evidence such as business plans and financial 
projections used for their investment pitch and subsequent business development plans to 
help corroborate the evidence. Five of the face to face interviews have been presented in 
the report as detailed case study examples within a range of sectors and different 
investment/innovation stages.   
 
By the end of 2011, six funds had closed, which is relatively early within the investment 
process, with 44 investments in 43 businesses recorded by September 2011. Just under 
half (48 per cent) of the investments have been made into UK based businesses. To some 
extent this balance of overseas investment might reflect the earlier closure dates of the 
European based funds UKIIF has invested in (e.g. Acton GmbH, based in Munich, 
Germany), although it may be in-line with UKIIF’s minimum 45 per cent UK business 
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investment requirement. Overseas business investments at this stage have mainly been 
within Europe (19, with 11 businesses being based in Germany).  
 
More detailed examination of the UK based business investments, which provide the 
sampling frame for the recipient business research, indicates that two funds dominate 
current investments; SEP Environmental Energies with nine investments which were 
acquired from a corporate VC fund and EIF DFJ Esprit Capital II, which has been very 
active in making six new investments. Broad sectoral analysis (Figure 2.1) indicates that 
investments are being made within the key target sectors the UKIIF aims to support, with a 
high proportion (52 per cent) of low carbon business investments into energy (including 
hydro, solar, wave and heat pump energy technologies) and recycling. This sectoral bias is 
reflective of the dominant levels of investment, at the time of this assessment, within the 
SEP Environmental Energies Fund.  An examination of the geographical spread of 
investments into UK based businesses demonstrates widespread coverage (Figure 2.2). It 
is worth noting that the UKIIF funds are not geographically restricted and are market 
driven, seeking the best investment options for the funds. Whilst almost half (48 per cent) 
of UK business investments are located in London the East and South East regions, 
Scotland and the North West also account for more than one quarter (29 per cent) and the 
Midlands account for 14 per cent.  
 
Figure 2.1: UKIIF UK Broad Sectoral 
Investment 
42%
23%
10%
10%
10%
5%
Energy/Low Carbon 
IT/communications
Life Science
Electronics  
Recycling
Advanced Manufacturing
 
Note: base n=21 
Source: UKIIF Management Information 
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Figure 2.2: UKIIF Geographical Spread of 
UK Investments 
24%
14%
14%
14%
10%
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South East
London
East
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North West
South West
Scotland
 
Note: base n=21 
Source: UKIIF Management Information 
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3. SURVEY OF UKIIF FUND 
MANAGERS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
3.1 Introduction 
Ten interviews were conducted face to face and by telephone during February and March 
2012 with the two UKIIF fund of funds managers, six underlying fund managers and the 
British and European Venture Capital Associations to provide wider market views as 
stakeholders. 
Table 3.1:  Fund Manager and Stakeholder interviews conducted 
Date Fund/Stakeholder Method 
07/02/12 Zouk Cleantech II Face to Face 
08/02/12 Scottish Equity Partners Environmental Energies Fund/SEP IV Face to Face 
08/02/12 Hermes GPE Environmental Innovation Fund Face to Face 
14/02/12 EIF UK Future Technologies Fund Telephone 
20/02/12 Gilde Healthcare III Telephone 
24/02/12 Advent Life Sciences Face to Face 
01/03/12 British Venture Capital Association Face to Face 
01/03/12 DFJ Esprit III Face to Face 
02/03/12 WHEB Partners Cleantech 2 Face to Face 
08/03/12 European Venture Capital Association Telephone 
 
The interviews took between 1 hour and 1.5 hours, with underlying fund manager 
interviews taking longer and in some cases being supplemented by additional follow-up 
telephone conversations.  Three underlying fund managers were interviewed from each of 
the two fund of funds in which UKIIF money has been invested.  While the Scottish Equity 
Partners (SEP) interview was selected on the basis of Hermes GPE’s investment in SEP’s 
Environmental Energies Fund, the interview discussion also covered SEP’s experience in 
raising and investing their SEP IV fund, which has received investment from both Hermes 
and the EIF UK Future Technologies Fund.  The Stakeholder interviews were conducted 
with the Chairman of the BVCA and the EVCA Head of External Relations. 
The six fund managers’ interviews were conducted under 10 main headings to provide 
comparison with the recipient business experience: 
 Details of the Fund 
 Relationship to fund of funds and UKIIF 
 Investment Strategy 
 Characteristics of Applicant Businesses 
 The Application Process 
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 Portfolio Management 
 Fund Performance 
 Impact on Supply of Finance and Financial Markets 
 Impact on Innovation 
 Impact of/Approaches to Government Intervention 
 
A similar structure was used for the fund of funds manager interviews, with a focus on the 
merits of the fund of funds model replacing the discussion on the fund of funds relationship 
and ‘Identification and selection of funds for investment’ replacing the investment strategy 
and application process sections.  Stakeholder interviews replaced the sections on 
strategy and process with a wider discussion on the stakeholders’ views on the technology 
venture capital market. 
3.2 Details of the Funds 
The underlying funds interviewed covered a range of technologies including cleantech, 
energy efficiency, life sciences, medical technologies, IT and advanced manufacturing. All 
of the funds except one had reached their final close. 
The combined overall private sector leverage of the funds examined is currently around 21 
times10 the initial UKIIF investment by the UK government. While this leverage figure may 
change significantly as further investments in underlying funds are completed, if 
maintained it would imply that some £3bn of venture capital investment will be made 
available for investment in high technology companies through the funds supported by the 
UKIIF’s original £150m investment. Whilst some of this is additional funding, in some 
cases, funding received was already earmarked by the investors for deployment in the VC 
market so can not be considered additional. Four of the six fund managers interviewed 
received their UKIIF-backed investment as part of a second or subsequent close of their 
fund, with only two receiving it as part of a first close.  As reaching first close is the most 
critical step in the existence of a fund this may indicate that the leverage effect of UKIIF is 
questionable as the majority of the funds would have existed even without the UKIIF 
investment.  However, such a conclusion needs to be qualified in two ways: 
(i) Some of the fund investments were made immediately after the launch of UKIIF into 
funds that had already approached the fund of funds manager concerned before 
UKIIF was established. It was more likely that the investment would be after first 
close in such circumstances. If so, first close fund investments might be expected to 
be at later dates. This is confirmed within the sample of funds interviewed. The first 
close funds represent investments made in the second half of 2011. The second or 
subsequent close investments were all made in 2010.  It is therefore probably too 
early to assess the full impact of UKIIF on helping funds to reach first close. 
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(ii) The fund managers of three of the funds that received investments on second or 
subsequent closes stated that the funds would not have been as large without the 
UKIIF investment.  Apart from the direct benefit of the investment the managers 
also indicated that the credibility of the fund of funds managers’ brand name and 
the introductions given to other potential investors helped them to achieve a larger 
fund by final close. Given this, it is reasonable to conclude that there were 
significant leverage effects even where the fund investment was made after first 
close. 
Some of the underlying fund managers were unwilling to disclose specific details of other 
investors so a comprehensive picture of the sources of total commitments is not available, 
but types of investors identified can be summarised as in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2: Other Sources of Matched Funding 
 
% of n=9 
funds 
Fund 
of 
funds 
Bank Financial 
Instit. 
Corporate 
Investor  
Other 
government 
funding 
VC 
Fund 
Mgt 
HNW 
indiv’s 
Family 
Office 
% by 
fund no.  
56% 33% 89% 56% 33% 22% 22% 56% 
No. of 
funds 
5 3 8 5 3 2 2 5 
Source: Fund of Fund and underlying Fund Managers  
3.3 The Fund of Funds model  
The fund of funds model was generally viewed favourably as an approach for the public 
sector to support venture capital investment by both the fund of funds managers and the 
underlying fund managers.  Advantages were seen as including: 
 The leverage effect on public sector funds invested. 
 The ability of the investor to diversify their investment over a wider range of fund 
managers and business investments, so increasing the chance of obtaining a good 
return on the investment and supporting more businesses. 
 Access to professional fund of funds managers who will have greater competence 
at assessing funds, focus on the industrial subsectors of interest and in assessment 
of fund managers’ strategies. 
 Access through fund of funds managers to other private investors who may invest 
alongside the public funding.  The credibility of the fund of funds managers will 
make it easier to attract such investors to co-invest. 
 Bringing a commercial market perspective that is less vulnerable to political 
lobbying. 
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However, challenges include: 
 A double layer of fees (fund of funds and underlying fund managers fees). 
 Less investor influence over investment decisions. 
The design of the UKIIF was not seen as impacting significantly on its financial or 
economic performance except that the requirement for any direct co-investments by fund 
of fund managers to be alongside underlying fund investments may slow the rate of 
investment of the fund of funds concerned. 
3.4 Relationship of Fund Managers to the Fund of Funds and 
UKIIF 
Fund of funds managers saw their relationship with Capital for Enterprise (CfEL), the arms 
length body responsible for managing the funds on behalf of BIS as good, with regular 
contact and discussion of the investment pipeline and other matters.  The relationship with 
BIS was also good but much more limited, with a focus more on press releases, political 
and policy matters. 
The underlying fund managers generally already had an investment relationship with 
Hermes and/or EIF before their present funds and had received UKIIF funds through that 
relationship.  They were aware that the Hermes/EIF funds of funds included Government-
sourced funding but this did not change their perception of the funds.  The relationship with 
Hermes or EIF was far more important to them because of: 
 The reputational effect on other private sector investors of having a credible investor 
in the first close of the fund.  This was particularly stressed for Hermes, where the 
Hermes-Gartmore brand is seen as having a very strong reputation internationally. 
 The importance of having existing investors in previous funds renew their 
commitment with a new fund in order to attract other investors.  This was 
particularly stressed by some fund managers who had EIF investment in previous 
funds. 
 The value of having support from UKIIF to ensure the fund reaches first close, as 
many private sector financial institutions will not even begin to consider investing 
unless they are certain the fund will go ahead.   
Respondents comments included: 
“Hermes was very helpful in reaching final close.  Hermes reputation as an investor helps 
on size – and a fund size of less than £100m is sub-optimal” 
“Hermes commitment was very helpful.  The brand of Hermes-Gartmore helped 
internationally more than the UK Government commitment.” 
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“It would have been materially harder to raise funds without Hermes.  They came into the 
first close of [the current fund] after being in [the previous fund].  Hermes is highly 
regarded in the market and was critical to the whole thing.” 
“It would have been quite difficult but not impossible.  It is important with a new fund to 
make sure that current cornerstone investors invest in the new fund so EIF involvement 
was important.” 
3.5 Identification and Selection of Funds for Investment 
The fund of funds managers rely mainly on their networks to identify suitable funds for 
investment.  Active marketing is low as the managers are well known in the fund 
management market although managers may write articles and speak at conferences. The 
quality of fund applications is considered good and sufficient to achieve investment 
targets. 
The selection process generally begins with an enquiry, followed up by further detail if the 
fund manager is not already known.  Initial meetings are held, followed by screening, 
benchmarking and early due diligence.  There is then usually an early stage investment 
committee preview of the proposal.  If the fund passes this stage then there will be further 
due diligence followed by a final investment proposal to the investment committee for a 
Yes/No decision on investment. 
Fund of funds managers were reluctant to commit to specific examples where provision of 
investment had enabled funds to attract other sources of investment but were generally 
aware of the influence of their commitment on the funds fundraising activities, claiming 
there was a ‘drag-along’ impact on other investors that helped funds to reach their target 
size. 
Government requirements were not seen as having an impact on the choice of funds to 
invest in by either fund manager. 
3.6 Fund Investment Strategies 
The funds receiving UKIIF investment cover a wide range of stages from seed/start-up 
investments (e.g. Advent) to a focus on growth companies with potential for international 
market development (e.g. Zouk).  Investment sizes can range from £0.5m up to £20m 
depending on the fund strategy and company receiving the investment but a typical 
average investment seems to be in the £10-12m range. 
When asked about distinctiveness of their approach, the factors emphasised by managers 
included: 
 The experience of the investment management team 
 An active, intense hands-on approach to involvement in companies 
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 Providing added-value through a strong interaction with management 
 A strong track record 
 A focus on start-ups 
 Ability to make the investee company global from the start of the investment 
 Time to exit 
It is notable that in a question focused on ‘distinctiveness’ the first 3 reasons above were 
cited by several managers. 
The key positive qualities looked for in new investments were fairly consistent across all 
fund managers and included: 
 Good management/quality of entrepreneur 
 Large underlying market giving growth potential 
 Compelling product with Intellectual Property Rights and barriers to entry 
 Relevance to the technologies the particular fund specialises in 
Negative qualities were usually seen as the mirror image of the positive qualities (i.e. poor 
management, limited market, weak IPR). 
UKIIF funding was not seen as affecting the fund’s investment strategy except for 
requirement to achieve specified targets for UK investment (although the common view 
was that these targets would have been met anyway through normal investment activity). 
All funds syndicated their investments at least in some cases.  Views on difficulty of 
syndication varied, with some seeing it as difficult while others indicated they had regular 
partners with whom they syndicated.  These partners were often overseas funds from e.g. 
the USA with the fund manager acting as lead investor to bring them in to the investment.  
This can be seen as an additional leverage benefit to the UK where the investment is in a 
UK company. 
Fund promotion with all fund managers relies heavily on specialist networks and the 
reputation of funds in the market in order to seek out and attract investee companies.  
Managers also speak at and attend conferences and other public events.  All funds have 
websites but do not seem to see them as a significant promotional component for the fund.  
Advisors play some role in bringing deals to the funds, but this is more likely to refer to 
other entrepreneurs, co-investors, non-exec directors, academics or industry contacts 
rather than accountants, bankers and lawyers. 
 
26 
 
Early Assessment of the UK Innovation Investment Fund 
3.7 Applicant Businesses and the Application Process 
Most fund managers do not think in terms of a formal application process, making it 
difficult to assess demand in terms of ‘quality enquiries’ and formal applications.  However 
with most of the interviewed funds the number of proposals resulting in meetings or 
significant evaluation work is at least 500-600 per annum and in two cases considerably 
higher.  Actual investments of between 0.5 to 2 per cent11 of the level of proposals are 
made per annum.   
Overall quality of proposals were regarded as ‘varied’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘high’ by different 
fund managers.  One manager observed that: 
“Overall quality is much better than 10 years ago, the internet has enabled people to move 
on, express projects and identify key drivers.  The key is to spend time with the 
entrepreneur and his vision.” 
However one manager objected that: 
“It doesn’t really work like that.  We build on relationships over at least 4 months, then 
there is a formal application”. 
This fits with the observation that four of the six fund managers claimed to offer significant 
pre-investment support to potential applicants: 
“We provide feedback, introductions, access to networks and shared due diligence on 
research, the market and interest from acquirers”. 
“We spend time with potential high quality opportunities to pull their case together” 
“We will spend time advising businesses and introducing people.” 
Most of the fund managers have seen demand for equity investment rising over time.  
They attribute this to lack of availability of debt or mezzanine funding, both in the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe, as well as an increase in good early-stage investment opportunities 
coming into the market. 
3.8 Portfolio Management 
All fund managers see themselves as pro-active, hands-on investors who take seats on 
the company’s Board and are in regular contact with the CEO.  Management information 
such as management and audited accounts and Board packs are received.  One partner is 
typically limited to caring for five portfolio companies, with between two and four days per 
month spent on each company.   
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When dealing with underperformance fund managers place emphasis on engagement with 
management and Board agreement rather than formal rights and actions, although 
management may be replaced as a final measure.  Management teams were seen as 
varied on application, with most fund managers expecting to have to strengthen them as 
part of the investment.  Financial control was the other area commonly cited by fund 
managers as requiring strengthening. 
Fund managers see themselves as providing significant added value through: 
 Partner expertise  
 Networks of contacts, particularly for product marketing  
 Advice on general and IP strategy 
 Strengthening management and the Board 
 Identifying co-investors 
 Managing exits 
Fund managers believe that many of the companies concerned would have not got 
funded, performed less well, not got an exit or even ‘gone bust’ without this added value.   
Innovation and commercialisation benefits are seen as coming from companies invested.  
This can include attracting overseas high-tech companies to the UK, to work with or even 
take-over investee companies. 
3.9 Fund Performance 
All fund managers felt that it was too early to assess actual company performance as 
funds are only a few months to two years old. The fund of funds managers do not expect 
the UKIIF fund to be fully realised until well after 2020, with full realisation taking over 12 
years from first close. Underlying fund managers expect the performance of their funds to 
be in the top quartile within the market, a view supported by the fund of fund managers.   
The current economic climate was seen as favourable to investment with less competition 
in the market and more realistic valuations, although there is a need to avoid companies 
with success linked to GDP growth in Europe. 
When asked if now was a good time to make investments in high growth potential 
businesses, responses included: 
“Definitely, the subdued economy means that only the most experienced and robust CEOs 
will try to create opportunities.  There is not much heat in the market.” 
“Yes, absolutely!  Valuations are more realistic although exits are later, further up the 
cycle.” 
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“Yes – companies can get expensive unemployed people cheaply.  Downturns reduce big 
company advantage.” 
The wider benefits of company investment were considered too early to fully assess 
although examples were cited already of: 
 Company growth 
 Job creation  
 Access to export markets 
 Technological innovation 
 Strengthening of management 
Given that many of the companies are small and at an early stage of their development the 
impact of the recession was seen as limited and sometimes positive (e.g. by lowering 
recruitment costs).  The key issue is whether the recession will be over before the fund 
wishes to exit its investments. 
3.10 Impact on Supply of Finance and Financial Markets 
The UKIIF fund is strongly seen as addressing a gap in the market in 2009, particularly by 
the fund managers.  The presence of UKIIF investment is seen as a positive influence in 
getting other private investors to come in, particularly to specialist funds.  The need for 
government support is seen as still continuing today.  Fund manager comments include: 
“Very strongly – it is helpful to have home market investors deploying capital.  UK based 
institutions focused on the venture capital market are very few” 
“It was very important in 2009.  Because of the financial crisis fundraising was very 
difficult” 
“It met a market gap at the time because of institutional reluctance to invest in venture 
capital” 
This need is seen as continuing because: 
 Historic returns from early-stage investment have not been good which has tainted 
institutions views. 
 The denominator effect took hold whereby institutions are committed to having a 
certain percentage of their investments in venture capital.  If the value of other 
investments such as quoted equities falls faster than the value of VC investments 
then the VC investment percentage rises causing the institution to reduce VC 
investment to maintain the VC investment at the required ratio. 
29 
 
Early Assessment of the UK Innovation Investment Fund 
 The current Euro crisis is discouraging high-risk investment (VC is a high risk asset 
class). 
 Innovation creates economic activity and wealth, but the process is imperfect and 
involves high-risk capital investment which is in short supply. 
 It enables the UK to fully exploit the benefits of its universities, research base and 
entrepreneurial culture. 
Despite these difficulties all fund managers claimed that they had been able to attract new 
investors to their new funds.  UKIIF is not seen as directly crowding out private investors.   
However concern was expressed by some stakeholders at the fast speed with which fund 
of funds managers were appointed. It was believed that the requirement to rapidly raise 
matched funds had resulted in less opportunity to attract a wider range of private investors.  
Some fund managers believed UKIIF could lead to displacement of EIF funds into the 
UKIIF funded EIF UKFTF that otherwise might have been directly invested into other UK 
VC funds. It must be remembered that the funds were established in 2009-10 when the 
supply of Venture Capital was declining and there was pressure for the fund to be 
established to support struggling businesses unable to raise equity finance. The UKIIF 
funding was seen as helpful in encouraging more fund managers and investment into the 
market although it was also emphasised that ultimately only good returns will do this. 
3.11 Impact on Innovation 
Although all managers stated that it is very early in their fund’s life to assess this question, 
several innovation benefits were cited including: 
 Development of an approach to rubber reprocessing with 1-10% of the CO2 effect of 
virgin rubber production 
 A new communications protocol that enables Wi-Fi over long distances and so can 
help rural communities 
 Development of a new lighter, more effective insulation product 
 A portable oxygen concentrator that improves patient mobility 
Several funds have investments with links to UK universities – particularly those funds 
focusing on seed/early stage investments. 
When asked to cite wider benefits from invested businesses most managers focused on 
economic rather than technical benefits (e.g. employment, tax generation, attracting other 
entrepreneurs) although university R&D sponsorship and building up the patent base were 
also cited. 
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3.12 Impact of/Approaches to Government Intervention 
UKIIF is generally not seen as duplicating other UK Government sponsored VC 
schemes/funds. The only query raised was about how the UKIIF will relate to the ‘Green 
Investment Bank’ initiative and the IFC Climate Catalyst Fund.   
The fund of funds model was seen as the best approach for this type of government 
initiative with preference for a UK approach to be maintained.  Surprise was expressed at 
the extent to which UKIIF allowed European investment, with its position perceived as 
more liberal than some other EU states (e.g. Germany).  There was a strong view that 
Government needed to continue to make equity funding available to technology 
companies due to current difficulties in the market.  Apart from the direct benefits to the 
investee businesses, Government support was seen as important to maintaining the 
infrastructure of venture capital technology investment in the UK at a time when many 
private sector fund managers were turning elsewhere.  Examples given include private 
sector fund managers focusing on purchase of existing portfolios cheaply due to the 
financial crisis and making money through selling it on rather than doing primary 
investment.  The attitude was “Why do the difficult stuff if you can buy assets cheap?”  The 
main investment need was seen as being above £1m, particularly in the £2-5m range.  
The recent changes to EIS legislation were seen positively as helping lower down the 
investment range. 
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4. SURVEY OF UKIIF RECIPIENT 
BUSINESSES 
4.1 Introduction 
This section presents findings from the survey of 16 UKIIF recipient businesses. The 
surveyed businesses are representative of the types of businesses being financed by 
underlying UKIIF funds, given that they represent almost two-fifths of the overall sample of 
businesses financed by the scheme at the end of the third quarter of 2011 and two-thirds 
of the UK owned and based businesses financed at that time (14/21). The businesses 
were surveyed either face to face, or by telephone interviews with the CEOs, or key 
Directors with overall knowledge of the financing and development of the business. The 
business interviews were completed in February 2012, with the average length of each 
interview being one hour.  
 
The businesses have been drawn almost equally between the two fund of funds; Hermes 
Environmental Innovation Fund (10 cases) and the European Investment Fund’s UK 
Future Technologies Fund (7 cases), with one business receiving investment from two 
underlying funds. The businesses have been drawn from five funds, three from Hermes 
EIF and two from the European Investment Fund’s UKFTF. The focus on the five funds is 
due to these having closed earliest and therefore being more advanced in their business 
investments and also the requirement to focus mainly on UK owned and based businesses 
(14 cases, from 13 businesses).  
 
The interviews aim to provide an overview of recipient businesses, outlining their key 
characteristics, reasons for seeking equity finance, customer journey and satisfaction, the 
range of alternative finance available and used, extent of deadweight and additionality and 
emerging impacts and spill over effects.  
 
4.2 Characteristics 
4.2.1 Sectoral distribution 
The surveyed recipient firms operate in four broad sectors; low carbon including energy 
and recycling, communications and IT, advanced manufacturing, and life science (Table 
4.1). This is reflective of the target markets of the VC funds sampled. For example the high 
proportion of energy sector activities relates to the SEP Environmental Energies and Zouk 
Cleantech Europe II funds, whilst the high proportion of communications and IT activities 
relates to the DFJ Capital Esprit III fund. 
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Within the Energy sector there are a range of activities being undertaken, including energy 
savings services and devices for the domestic and commercial sectors and smart tech 
solutions for integrating renewable energies into the National Grid. The communications/IT 
activities include: innovative use of white space wireless technology (e.g. for road toll 
systems), harnessing social media for enhanced customer service provision in the 
services sector; and real time solutions for monitoring stock market trading. Advanced 
manufacturing includes new plastic production using recycled materials to produce lighter, 
more durable products for the bottling industry, and new machinery for manufacturing 
recycled rubber. Life science activities include new therapeutic drug discoveries and 
advanced cancer treatment testing methods. 
 
Seven firms exhibit multiple sector classification, demonstrating how their highly innovative 
activities crossover traditional sectoral definitions. This includes all four of the recycling 
firms, including: energy recycling, re-using grey water from domestic baths in toilet and 
heating systems; advanced manufacturing, recycling and energy, in the case of biomass 
substitute coal energy for power stations; recycling and communications, in the case of 
monitoring control devices for recycling. There are also cases of communications and 
energy, involving advanced aerial inspection equipment for the oil and gas industry and 
the use of holographic 3D radar to allow wind farms to locate closer to airports.  
  
Table 4.1: Sectoral distribution of surveyed recipient firms        
Sector Number % (n=16) 
Low Carbon (including) 
 - Energy 
 - Recycling 
9 
7 
4 
56% 
44% 
25% 
Communications/IT 6 37% 
Advanced 
Manufacturing 3 19% 
Life Science 3 19% 
Note:  *one firm received from two UKIIF VC funds 
Seven firms have multiple sector classification  
 
 
4.2.2 Location 
Three of the surveyed recipient businesses are located overseas, in Germany, Eire and 
Canada (Table 4.2). One of these businesses has no linkages to the UK, whilst one was 
spun out from UK founders and is unlikely to return to the UK and a the third has acquired 
a UK business and is considering relocating to the UK. 
 
The thirteen UK owned and based businesses surveyed are predominately based in the 
London, South East and Eastern regions (9 cases), with two from Scotland and one each 
from the North West and South West of England. 
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Table 4.2: Location of surveyed recipient firms 
 
Region/Location Number % (n=16) 
Overseas 3 19% 
UK (total) 13 81% 
London 3 19% 
South East 3 19% 
East 3 19% 
South West 1 6% 
North West 1 6% 
Scotland 2 12% 
   
 
4.2.3 Business Stage  
The surveyed recipient businesses are predominately young early stage businesses, with 
11 established between 2009 and 2011 and only two businesses established for more 
than ten years. There was one case of a business buy-in in 2009 which effectively 
transformed an ailing established manufacturing business into a new globally innovative 
firm. Whilst the vast majority of surveyed businesses are currently trading (13/16), the time 
taken to reach trading status varied with five ‘soft start’ companies that were immediately 
able to trade (e.g. they had a consultancy service function, or tradable product which may 
have undergone further development) and six cases that had taken between one and two 
years to start trading. The three businesses that are not currently trading have 
considerably longer lead times, ranging from three years for a communications company 
up to eight years for a recycling/energy company.   
Nearly half (7/16) of the surveyed recipient businesses were spin outs, either from 
university research (4 cases), or from other companies in the sector (3 cases).     
 
In terms of their status at the time of receiving UKIIF VC funding, the surveyed recipient 
businesses are evenly spread from start-ups through early R&D and later stage R&D and 
commercialisation, to existing larger company growth investment. Examples of these 
stages include:  
 
 A start-up, one-stop, energy consultancy company seeking rapid growth in a niche 
market.  
 An early stage R&D spin out in the communications sector seeking to develop 
innovative IT software in-house for global stock exchange markets.   
 A later stage R&D/commercialisation company in the rubber manufacturing 
recycling sector, seeking final R&D for machinery leading to full commercialisation 
on a global scale. 
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 An established recycling company with 50 employees making a step change in 
growth by seeking US contracts and the acquisition of a software company for 
innovative R&D. 
 
Table 4.3: Business stage of recipient at time of funding 
Business Stage Number % (n=16) 
Start-up 5 31% 
Early stage R&D 4 25% 
Later R&D and 
commercialisation 4 25% 
Existing company growth 3 19% 
 Note:  Stages accord with BVCA (2010) definitions12  
 
4.2.4 Level of Innovation 
A crucial aspect of UKIIF is that it funds innovative businesses that have the potential to 
make a difference in terms of their potential business growth and development. In order to 
gauge the level of innovation in each business, the surveyed managers were asked if they 
thought that their business is currently innovative, whether they have patents or copyrights 
protecting their intellectual property, how their innovation was developed and how “cutting 
edge” their current technology is compared to the wider market.  
 
The surveyed businesses all appear to be highly innovative. Half of the managers stated 
that they are global leaders within their sector and the remaining interviewed managers 
stated that their business is the leader in the UK sector. In some of the latter cases, such 
as two life science businesses focusing initially on meeting UK regulatory requirements, 
the innovations are also likely to be global leaders.  
 
One surveyed manager from an energy sector company developing advanced control 
systems exemplified the global leading status of their company by stating: 
 
“We are beyond cutting edge. This is a world first in providing a customer led rather than 
utility company led approach to energy saving and promoting more efficient use of 
alternative energy sources.” 
 
The extent of innovation is highlighted by all of the surveyed businesses having either 
product patents or software copyrights to protect their intellectual property. One highly 
                                            
12These definitions accord with BVCA (2010) investment stage definitions: ‘seed’ refers to developing the business 
concept; ‘start-up’ refers to product development and initial marketing; ‘early stage’ refers to moving to initial 
commercialisation; ‘later stage’ refers to developing commercialisation into profitability; ‘expansion’ refers to 
established ventures developing new products. 
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innovative cancer treatment testing company has 15 patents registered, so far. Even in 
cases where existing IT software has been innovatively adapted for new uses, such as in 
the cases of using social media to improve service sector customer services and real time 
monitoring and reporting on stock exchange trading activities, software copyrights have 
been taken out.    
 
Innovations were achieved through a variety of means, but largely demonstrate the need 
for harnessing external expertise. The most frequently mentioned approach, in seven 
cases, involved either university spin-outs or collaborations through Knowledge Transfer 
Partnerships (KTPs) or European FP7 projects. Four businesses innovated through 
industry spin-outs, notably in three cases where software had been innovatively adapted. 
Two businesses innovated through strategic acquisitions of companies with sector specific 
and IT software writing experience, whilst the remaining three businesses are developing 
innovations through the founders, in-house. However, in one of the cases currently being 
developed in-house for the UK market, the original product came from China. 
 
When asked whether their technology was “cutting edge” compared to the market, the vast 
majority indicated that this was the case. This was particularly the case for the advanced 
manufacturing companies that had developed revolutionary approaches to rubber 
recycling, biomass fuel and lightweight recycled plastics production. There were also 
completely ‘game changing’ technologies being used by companies in the energy, 
communications and life sciences sectors. For example, the use of 3D holographic radar 
to enable wind farms to be located closer to airports and ‘whitespace’ radio technology for 
improved wireless technology applications. In three cases where existing software 
technology had been adapted for novel uses, the approaches were still perceived as 
cutting edge. Only in the case of a grey water energy saving company was the technology 
deemed as less than cutting edge, however, the approach was nonetheless viewed as 
highly innovative.    
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4.2.5 Wider Benefits of Innovations  
The wider benefits of the innovative activities being undertaken were considerable (Figure 
4.1), with the majority impacting on reducing carbon footprint through energy savings and 
recycling activities and the majority also enabling savings in operational cost and time. 
One example was the innovative use of aerial drone surveillance of oil and gas rigs, 
enabling safety checks to be made whilst operating systems are still active, saving time 
and costs and minimising risk to human life.     
 
 
 
Note: base n=16, multiple responses provided 
4.3 Reason for Seeking Equity Investment 
The main reason (13 cases) for seeking equity finance was to fund research and 
development to develop new products and services (Figure 4.2). Other more frequently 
mentioned reasons included working capital (7 cases) for business development, new 
market entry for a start-up seeking immediate market entry in the UK and four overseas 
exporters. Five businesses were seeking start-up finance, three businesses were seeking 
asset equipment purchases (e.g. manufacturing equipment and vehicles), three existing 
businesses were seeking major step change expansion finance and three businesses 
were seeking strategic acquisitions (including one start-up).    
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Note:  respondents could provide multiple responses 
 
The vast majority of the recipient surveyed businesses (13 cases; 81 per cent) were 
seeking first round investment finance for start-up, early stage R&D or existing business 
growth. Three cases were seeking second round finance (including two receiving follow-on 
UKIIF/private VC finance), which was for further R&D and business growth and two cases 
seeking third round finance for later stage R&D, product manufacturing and 
commercialisation.   
 
All surveyed recipient businesses were seeking equity finance in order to develop or 
commercialise innovative products and services. All 13 of the UK owned and based 
recipient businesses were seeking equity finance to develop and commercialise products 
and services that are innovative to the UK market and in the majority of cases they are 
innovative to the global market.   
 
4.4 Amount of Finance Sought and Received 
The sixteen surveyed UKIIF recipient businesses were undertaking projects with a total 
aggregate cost of £96.3m at the time of funding, of which £45.7m (47 per cent) has been 
provided through UKIIF equity finance (Table 4.4). The average amount of UKIIF funding 
received by recipient businesses was almost £2.9m (median £2.4m), with a further £3 
million being received from other sources, mainly from other VCs and business angels, but 
also including bank debt finance. More than four fifths (83 per cent) of the UKIIF funding 
received by the surveyed businesses has been allocated to first round investment, with 
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around 10 per cent going to second round and just seven per cent going to third round 
investment.  
 
Table 4.4: UKIIF equity finance received by funding round 
Finance (£m)/Funding Round First Second Third Total 
Total Project Cost 83.3 6.5 6.6 96.3 
UKIIF received 38 4.3 3.3 45.7 
Average UKIIF 2.9 1.4 1.7 2.9 
Median UKIIF 2.6 0.8 1.7 2.4 
Other VC finance 14.4 2.1 0.8 17.3 
Other external equity (angels/bonds) 16.9 0 1 17.9 
Internal equity (founders/employees) 3.8 0 0 3.8 
Mezzanine and loan finance 8.3 0 0 8.3 
Total other finance raised 43.5 2.1 1.8 47.4 
% of UKIIF to project cost 46% 67% 50% 47% 
% of UKIIF to total finance raised 47% 67% 65% 49% 
Number of business cases 13 3 2 16 
Note: two businesses received follow on second round funding from UKIIF  
Euro finance has been converted (average rate of €1.15=£1) 
 
It is notable that UKIIF represents a considerably lower proportion of total project finance 
raised at the first round, at just under half, compared to rounds two and three which are 
around two thirds. This is perhaps due to the need for greater spread of risk at the earlier 
stages of investment, as well as the enhanced financial leverage that is possible once 
UKIIF is in place (see section 4.6). Certainly, there is a greater variety of types of finance 
exhibited in the first round cases, which includes other VC finance, business angel 
syndicates and individual high net worth investors. In one case £15.6m was raised from 
bond investments, one case received a £0.5m loan from a wind farm association, one 
case received a mezzanine loan of £7.8m, whilst in another case £1.3m came from 
business angels along with £1.8m from the founders and employees. At the second and 
third rounds finance has come either from VCs or business angels.  
 
UKIIF investments range from £75,000 start-up finance, with matched funding and second 
round follow-on finance to a company developing new surveillance techniques for the oil 
and gas industry, up to a £10.4m first round investment in an established recycling 
company diversifying into biomass energy R&D and production. The average and median 
amounts of UKIIF investments were higher in the first round than in the succeeding 
rounds. However, there were only five cases recorded across rounds two and three.         
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4.5 Customer Journey 
Although the UKIIF operates on a Fund of Funds model through Hermes GPE and the 
European Investment Fund, it is helpful to understand how innovative companies access 
equity investment. The surveyed recipient businesses were asked how they had found the 
underlying UKIIF fund. It should be noted that since the underlying fund was not promoted 
or identified under the UKIIF brand, this section explores how the recipient business found 
the underlying VC fund. In most cases this related to the respondent manager’s previous 
knowledge and experience of using VC finance and the types of funds that operate at their 
funding stage within their sector. Several of the interviewed managers were serial 
entrepreneurs who had previously used funds and five referred to knowing specific fund 
managers. Three managers specifically mentioned using VC finder services offered 
through an accountancy company, a larger spin-out company and a science park.   
 
Only two of the surveyed recipients had no choice of other finance, whilst in three further 
cases the UKIIF underlying fund was the only funding approached because the underlying 
fund was known and trusted. For the remaining businesses seven had between two and 
five private VC options, one had a corporate finance option, one had angel finance options 
and one had a bank finance option.   
 
In all cases the UKIIF underlying fund selected was described as the ‘first’ and ‘natural’ 
choice fund for recipients. Although a wide array of reasons were provided for fund 
selection (figure 4.3), this was largely due to sectoral specialism and fund manager 
expertise. It is worth noting that this finding is corroborated by the underlying fund 
manager interviews where they claimed that it is their reputation in the relevant sectors 
and networks that enabled them to find businesses to invest in. A recommendation from a 
VC finder or business contact also played a key role in a quarter of cases. In three cases, 
the VC’s willingness to assist with finding other funding was important.  
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Figure 4.3: Reason for UKIIF underlying fund 
selection
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Fund Manager
expertise
Sector
specialism
Recommendation
VC will ing to find
other funding
% (n=16)
 
Note:  respondents could provide multiple responses 
 
In more specific detail, surveyed managers’ statements included: 
 
“I know the fund manager, having worked with him previously on another early stage 
communications company and knew that they would provide excellent early stage sector 
support, understand what we are trying to achieve and offer the best valuation.”  CEO of a 
communications company seeking first round funding (from DFJ)        
 
“The VC was a great fit for our businesses as they have a US office with excellent working 
knowledge of the social media communications sector.”  CEO of a communications 
company seeking later stage R&D and commercialisation finance (from DFJ)  
 
“The fund has the best track record in cleantech finance in Europe.”  Director of a recycling 
company seeking first round finance for a biomass energy production project (from Zouk) 
 
“The fund was really helpful in negotiating licensing arrangements prior to our start-up and 
really knows the early stage life science market.”  CEO of a life science start-up, seeking 
first round finance (from Advent) 
 
“This is a specialist energy fund with access to other matched funds.” CEO of an energy 
company seeking second round follow-on finance for later stage R&D (from SEP) 
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“The fund is a cleantech specialist, with a fund manager who really knows their stuff and 
who can help us in US and European export expansion plans.”  CEO of a recycling 
company seeking second round finance for acquisition and expansion (from WHEB) 
 
4.5.1 Knowledge of UK government funding 
Interviewed managers were asked if they knew about UK government investment through 
UKIIF in their selected VC fund. Only in one case was this known at the time of funding. 
Indeed, the vast majority were not aware of UK government investment until the time of 
this survey, but those with knowledge were keen to stress that it was a ‘good idea’ and 
‘much needed’. All of the surveyed managers indicated that they had not noticed anything 
different about the UKIIF funding process to that experienced from other private VCs.  
 
When asked whether knowing about the UK government funding had changed their 
perception of the VC fund the vast majority were ambivalent stating that ‘it makes no 
difference’.  Several surveyed managers were very supportive, suggesting that it was 
particularly good as early stage funding is very hard to find, whilst a couple were 
pleasantly surprised that they had not encountered the usual “bureaucracy and red tape 
associated with government schemes.”       
 
4.5.2 Funding process time       
The average time taken for the surveyed recipient businesses to find and obtain funding 
was nine months. This ranged from as little as one month in the case of a business 
established by a former VC fund manager up to three years in a case where the economic 
down-turn had prevented access to bank finance, which was a vital element of the deal 
structure.   
 
The process of finding UKIIF funding varied considerably, depending on each business 
management’s previous experience in finding and using equity finance and their initial 
choice of finance. Four businesses found the underlying UKIIF fund immediately, or within 
one month, because they knew they required private VC funding and knew the funds and 
fund managers that would be most likely to fit their requirements.  
 
The average time to find the fund was between three to four months and this was typical 
where ‘VC finders’ were used and where an initial period of setting out a memorandum for 
investors was undertaken; producing business plans, cash-flows, projections, market 
research and references. Five businesses took between six to nine months to find the 
underlying UKIIF fund and this was typically because the search for finance had been 
focused on other types of funders, such as business angels. For example one interviewed 
manager complained that: 
 
 “It was taking far too long to find sufficient finance from angels because they are 
fragmented and it requires separate negotiations for each investor. Once we brought in a 
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board member to find private VC finance, this proved to be a much quicker and more 
productive approach.”  CEO of a communications company 
 
A Director of a European recycling company stated: 
 
“We initially looked at funding in our own country, but these were buyout funds and we 
wanted to retain ownership, so eventually found a couple of private VC funds which 
offered more suitable options for us.”         
The average time taken to undertake due diligence and negotiate contracts was five 
months. This ranged from one month where the businesses were well prepared for this 
process up to eight months for a complex life science spin-out which required licensing 
agreements.   
 
In two further cases the process of seeking equity finance had been interrupted by the 
economic down-turn. In one case the business put the private equity financing on hold for 
18 months until the market improved, whilst in another case bank finance was required as 
part of the deal structure. The CEO of this UK based advanced manufacturing business 
explained:  
 
“Obtaining private equity finance was not our major concern. The key was getting bank 
finance. For three years we sought bank finance from the UK, but no one was interested. 
In the end we took up a mezzanine type loan with a Czech bank.” 
More specifically, surveyed managers were asked if they had experienced problems with 
the application process for the UKIIF finance.  Only three managers made complaints. One 
CEO suggested that the due diligence process was very extensive and time consuming 
and that the overall legal costs and time taken up in negotiations over a seven month 
period was more than necessary. Another CEO noted that the UKIIF fund they selected 
did not assist start-ups and in order to overcome this issue they had to acquire an existing 
company. A third CEO complained that the UKIIF fund selected did not provide all of the 
finance required and was not particularly helpful in finding other equity finance: 
“The fund were keen to invest, but only wanted to put in a small amount. They said we 
needed more investors, but didn’t help much in that process, providing a bit of coaching 
but didn’t pitch with us. I think they wanted to test me to see if I was up to it.” 
4.6 Funding Leverage 
Funding leverage has been calculated by obtaining surveyed managers’ views as to the 
net investment obtained during each funding round as a result of the investment made by 
UKIIF; defined as ‘attributable leveraged finance’. In two cases no other finance was 
received at the time of the UKIIF investment round, whilst in another four cases it was 
explained that the other finance raised was already in place at the time. In one case this 
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included a large scale bond issue which was raised separately in parallel to the search for 
VC finance. Another of these managers commented: 
 
“UKIIF finance was welcome, but it was brought in at the second round by our existing 
VC.”   CEO of an established overseas recycling company.   
Therefore, Table 4.5 below presents net attributable leveraged finance which surveyed 
managers were certain could not have been raised at the time of the funding round without 
the UKIIF fund acting as a lead investor.  
 
Table 4.5: UKIIF attributable leverage 
Finance (£m)/Funding Round First Second Third Total 
Total Project Cost 83.3 6.5 6.6 96.3 
UKIIF received 38 4.3 3.3 45.7 
UKIIF attributable leveraged finance 24.5 0.7 0 25.2 
% of leveraged finance to UKIIF 65% 15% 0% 55% 
Number of business cases 13 3 2 16 
Note: two businesses received follow on second round funding from UKIIF  
Euro finance has been converted (average rate of €1.15=£1) 
 
Of the 16 recipient businesses surveyed, these businesses received a total of £45.7m 
UKIIF investment, which then leveraged an additional £25.2m from other funding sources, 
representing more than half (55 per cent) of the initial UKIIF investment. The proportion of 
attributable leveraged finance was greatest during the first round, when the lead 
investment role of the UKIIF funds was perceived as most vital in contributing to obtaining 
additional finance. In all of the surveyed cases, the UKIIF underlying fund was the largest 
VC investor in the investment round examined. Only in one case, involving second round 
funding of a recycling company, was the UKIIF underlying VC fund not the lead investor, 
as it was levered in by an existing first round VC. This case has not been included as 
attributable leveraged funding in Table 4.5.     
 
In several cases, surveyed managers were keen to express their appreciation of the work 
done by the UKIIF underlying fund in assisting with finding, pitching and negotiating for 
additional VC and bank finance, whilst others noted that having VC finance was a crucial 
tipping factor which gave confidence to other investors such as business angels 
syndicates and high net worth individuals to invest.  
 
 “The [UKIIF] VC’s market knowledge and willingness to work with us to find another VC 
were invaluable.”  CEO of an advanced manufacturing company seeking first round 
finance. 
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“As a result of the [UKIIF] funding we were able to get further investment from a private 
investor and also a bank loan supported by the Enterprise Finance Guarantee.”  CEO of a 
communications business seeking first round finance.  
“It has been a very good experience and the [UKIIF] fund have been unusually supportive, 
helping with the process of accessing finance, including pitching. They wanted another VC 
partner, as it is part of the validation process, leading to greater mutual strength - if they 
can get several VC backers it will add value.”   CEO of an overseas advanced 
manufacturing and recycling company, seeking first and second round finance.  
 
4.6.1 UKIIF shareholding 
The shareholding held by the UKIIF underlying funds amongst the 16 surveyed recipient 
businesses varied from 17 per cent to 50 per cent. The average UKIIF shareholding in 
these companies, allowing for dilutions, is currently 31 per cent (median 29 per cent).  
 
4.6.2 Further external funding 
Interviewed managers were asked if they would require additional external funding for their 
business and, if so, whether initial UKIIF funding had led to subsequent opportunities for 
funding, after the round in which UKIIF finance was first received.  
 
Three quarters (12) of the surveyed recipient businesses stated that they would require 
additional external finance. The most frequently mentioned reason for requiring further 
finance was to assist exports, particularly in the US market. Two recipient businesses 
referred to later stage R&D and one life science business will require additional funding for 
clinical trials, whilst other recipients were close to commercialisation such as an advanced 
manufacturer which will require additional finance to build its final machines and a 
communications company requiring additional finance to operate an initial service 
application (Figure 4.4). 
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Note:  respondents could provide multiple responses 
 
When asked about the time frame to the next round of investment, two surveyed 
businesses had recently received their next round finance, which in both cases involved 
follow-on investment from the UKIIF underlying fund. A further six cases were currently 
seeking additional external finance with a view to securing this within the next 6-12 
months. In half of these cases there was an expectation that the UKIIF VC would provide 
at least half the funding required. In four cases, the next round of funding was likely to be 
between 2-3 years away and at that stage it was expected that the UKIIF VC would be 
bought out, for example through a larger Corporate VC, IPO or management buy-out. 
 
The amount of external funding required at the next round of funding ranged from £1m up 
to £10m, with an average of £5.1m (median £4.4m).  
 
Overall five surveyed managers felt that their underlying UKIIF VC would provide further 
investment, but in some cases it was acknowledged that their UKIIF VC would no longer 
be the lead investor during the next stage of funding, although it was believed that they 
would assist in finding new VC partner investors. In the cases where the UKIIF VC was not 
expected to invest further in the business, this typically related to later stage funding where 
it was felt that a different type of investor would be required. For example, several of the 
businesses seeking to expand into the US market will specifically seek US VCs, whilst 
other later stage companies will seek corporate VC finance to assist with 
commercialisation. Several managers remarked that their UKIIF VC was selected for their 
specialism with early stage financing in the sector and that other VCs would be better 
placed for the commercialisation stage.   
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Although only a third of cases (5) appear likely to receive further finance from their UKIIF 
VC, when asked whether their involvement gave them greater confidence in raising further 
finance, all interviewed managers believed this to be the case. For around half this was 
because the VC would either provide further funding or at least help to find other investors. 
Even where this was not the case, for example a business that will be pursuing a strategy 
of developing corporate user groups that will invest in the business and assist faster 
growth than the private UKIIF VC can deliver, there was a strong belief that “having the 
[UKIIF] VC on board gave the business far greater credibility with other investors and 
financial institutions.”   
 
4.7 Impact of UKIIF Investment   
This section provides an early assessment of the likely impacts of UKIIF finance on the 16 
surveyed recipient businesses. Since these businesses have only received funding within 
the last two years and in some cases only a month or two prior to the survey taking place, 
the data provided should be viewed in context and treated with some caution. This 
section focuses on sales turnover, business profitability, employment and exporting 
activities, examining actual and forecast changes that have taken place since initial receipt 
of UKIIF finance for the first year and for three years thereafter.   
 
4.7.1 Sales turnover 
 
Table 4.6: Sales Turnover at time of UKIIF funding and future forecasts 
Sales (£m) 
Time of  
Funding 
1 Year after 
funding 
3 Years after 
funding 
Average 13.1 17.5 39.1 
Median 1.2 4 20 
Range 100k to 59.1m  870k to 91.3m 100k to 113m 
n= 7 13 14 
    
Seven businesses provided annual sales turnover data for the time of initial UKIIF funding, 
indicating that they were already trading at that time. At that stage these businesses had 
an average sales turnover of £13.1m (median £1.2m). Thirteen businesses provided sales 
turnover for 12 months after funding (some actual and some forecast). At this stage the 
average sales turnover reported was £17.5m (median £4m), ranging from £870,000 up to 
£91.3m. In three years after the initial UKIIF funding, 14 businesses estimate annual sales 
turnover aggregating £546.7m. At this stage the estimated average annual sales turnover 
will be £39.1m (median £20m), ranging from £100,000 to £113m and with five businesses 
forecasting over £50m in sales turnover. Overall, taking the average sales turnover for the 
15 surveyed businesses providing data (including one that will not be trading within three 
years) from the time of initial UKIIF funding (£6m) to the estimate for three years after 
initial funding (£36m), the average sales turnover for surveyed businesses is forecast to 
increase by £30m (a median increase of £20m).     
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4.7.2 Net Profitability 
Table 4.7: Net Profitability at time of UKIIF funding and future forecasts 
 
Time of  
Funding 
1 Year after 
funding 
3 Years after 
funding 
Profitability Number % (n=16) Number % (n=16) Number % (n=16) 
Profit 3 19 9 55 14 88 
Breakeven 0 0 5 33 1 6 
Loss 4 25 1 6 0 0 
Not trading 9 56 1 6 1 6 
 
Just under half (7) of the UKIIF surveyed recipient businesses were trading at the time of 
receiving their first UKIIF funding, with only three cases achieving net profit.  
One year after receiving funding only one business will not be trading. At this stage the 
majority (55 per cent) of businesses report (some actual and some forecast) that they will 
be achieving net profit, with average projected net profitability of £3.4m (median £1.7m; 
n=6), ranging from £200,000 up to £12.2m in an established advanced manufacturing 
company. In three years time only two businesses are not forecasting net profits; a life 
science company that will not yet be trading and a communications company that will be at 
breakeven. In three year’s time the average net profitability forecast is £8.4m (median 
£7.4m; n=11), ranging from £500,000 up to £26.1m in an advanced manufacturing 
company.      
4.7.3 Employment  
Table 4.8: Employment at time of UKIIF funding and future forecasts  
 
Time of 
Funding 
1 Year after 
funding 
3 Years after 
funding 
Employment Number Number Number 
Aggregate 563 1359 2123 
Average 35 84 132 
Median 8 34 100 
Range 1 to 235 4 to 275 4 to 350 
Note: n=16 
 
All 16 UKIIF surveyed recipient businesses provided employment data. This indicated that 
at the time of initial UKIIF funding the aggregate employment was 563, with an average of 
35 employees (median 8 employees). The largest employer was an established advanced 
manufacturing company with 235 employees. Employment is reported (some actual and 
some forecast) to increase one year after funding by 141 per cent, with the average size 
rising to 84 employees (median 34 employees). In three years from initial funding the 
overall aggregate employment is forecast to have increased by 277 per cent, with the 
average size being 132 employees (median 100 employees). At this stage there will be 
three large businesses with 250 or more employees and only two small businesses with 
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less than 50 employees. Overall, over the three year period from initial UKIIF funding, 
average employment for the 16 recipient businesses is forecast to increase by 97 staff (a 
median increase of 92 staff).  
 
4.7.4 Exports 
In this section reporting relates to the 12 UK owned and based businesses that are 
currently trading or forecasting to start trading during the next three years.  
Table 4.9: Exports at time of UKIIF funding and future forecasts  
Exports 
Time of  
Funding 
1 Year after  
funding 
3 Years after  
funding 
% sales Number % (n=5) Number %(n=11) Number %(n=12) 
None 1 20 3 27 2 17 
1 to 24 1 20 2 18 2 17 
25 to 49 1 20 0 0 2 17 
50 to 74 0 0 3 27 3 25 
75+ 2 40 3 27 3 25 
N= 5 100 11 100 12 100 
 Note: changes in n=base due to numbers of UK businesses trading 
The number of UK owned and based recipient businesses exporting increases over time 
(Table 4.9), whilst the proportion remains very high at around four fifths. Four of the five 
(80 per cent) UK businesses trading at the time of UKIIF funding were exporting, whereas 
in three years time there are forecast to be 10 exporters (83 per cent) out of the 12 UK 
businesses that will be trading at that time. Furthermore, the proportion and volume of 
export sales activity within these businesses is typically increasing. At the time of UKIIF 
funding just two businesses were gaining over half of their sales turnover through exports, 
whilst in three years time this is likely to be the case for six UK based businesses.  
One year on from initial UKIIF funding six recipient UK owned and based businesses 
reported (some actual and some forecast) obtaining more than half of their annual sales 
turnover from exports and these are fast growth businesses. They include: an advanced 
manufacturing company where all sales of its innovative plastics products are generated 
from globally expanding export markets; a life science company whose cancer testing 
services are in high demand in mature economies leading to a doubling of sales year on 
year; an energy company whose software solutions to integrating renewable energies into 
the grid are in demand in European and North American markets, also leading to annual 
doubling of sales turnover over the next three years.   
However, not all high growth performance is related to exporting activities. A significantly 
rapid expanding UK energy company will not be seeking to export their services as they 
have established a niche foothold in the growing UK renewable energies market, where 
they can offer specialist one-stop-shop service to commercial and high net worth private 
customers.                   
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4.7.5 Performance attributable to UKIIF 
The surveyed UKIIF recipient business managers were asked to assess the overall extent 
to which the UKIIF VC funding had impacted on their overall business performance 
(assessing sales turnover, net profitability, employment and export sales where 
applicable).    
 
 
 
Note:  Funding proportion is estimated across two funding rounds in two cases. 
 Vertical axis represents percentage group, horizontal axis represents percentage of businesses  
 
It is evident from Figure 4.5 that the surveyed managers rated the input of the UKIIF VC 
funding very highly, at well beyond the financial value of the UKIIF funding that they 
received in proportion to the overall project cost. For example, whilst five recipient 
businesses (31 per cent) received less than half of the project cost through UKIIF VC 
finance, only one business (6 per cent) attributed the value of this input to their overall 
performance at less than 50 per cent. Furthermore, over two thirds (69 per cent; 11 of 16 
cases) attributed at least 75 per cent of their performance to the UKIIF input, with five 
cases (31 per cent) suggesting that it was totally responsible for their business 
performance.  
The main reasons for this assessment mainly related to the ability to go ahead with the 
project, the additional funding that UKIIF levered from other sources and the added value 
that the VCs had provided in the management and development of the business. For 
example, in an energy business where UKIIF VC funding amounted to less than half of the 
overall project cost, the interviewed CEO stated:        
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“I would value the fund’s input at about 60% of our current performance - probably more as 
the fund managers are really good and understand what is required for success. The 
insight and linkages that they provide are a huge advantage. The rest of our performance I 
put down to our own management capability and experience and some useful input from 
the other investors.” 
“The fund only provided two thirds of the finance for our project, but it also enabled us to 
find the remaining third from another VC investor. Without this finance we could not have 
developed our machinery, so 100 per cent of our current development is due to this.”  CEO 
of an advanced manufacturing company.    
 
4.7.6 Current performance  
Interviewed managers were asked to assess how the business was currently performing 
compared to the forecast at the time of receiving UKIIF funding. At this early stage, six (37 
per cent) are performing better than forecast, with half on target and only two businesses 
slightly behind. 
Those that were achieving better business growth/development results than expected 
were doing so mainly because the market for their products and services was stronger 
than expected. All of these businesses are UK owned and based and this was particularly 
the case in the energy sector (3 cases) and for exporters (3 cases). For example a 
communications company developing innovative wireless technology was experiencing 
considerable demand for its ‘machine to machine’ information technology which could be 
utilised by the rapidly expanding European road toll networks, whilst a life science cancer 
drug testing company was experiencing huge demand from developed countries for its 
services. The two underperforming businesses both remained very positive. One energy 
efficiency company was estimated to be about three months behind schedule, with the 
manager stating that he had “…set the bar high” and was “…confident of global business 
growth.”  The other advanced manufacturing business had experienced some market 
resistance and technical problems as the interviewed CEO explained:     
“The main problem has been that although the market for our work is out there, we have 
met some customer resistance because they don’t believe it is possible and also some 
technical problems with our processing equipment, but this will be ironed out, so it is taking 
longer to get established and generate cash-flow, which has led to the need for another 
round of VC funding.” 
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Note: n=16 
 
4.8 Ease of Access to Equity Finance 
The surveyed UKIIF recipient business managers were asked to assess how easy it has 
been for their types of business to obtain equity finance in the market and how this 
compares to any previous experience that they may have had. The responses were very 
mixed, being largely dependent on the business’s sector, stage of product/service 
development and level of experience in raising equity finance.  
Just over half of the surveyed managers (9 cases) suggested that the process had been 
“as easy as could be expected.” They acknowledged that there was a need to provide 
detailed and credible business plans and forecasts and that it really helped to have the 
right management team on board with experience in finding, pitching and negotiating with 
VCs. Some had struggled initially to find VC finance, but had then achieved success by 
using professional VC finder services, or by recruiting experienced managers with 
experience in using VC finance. It was also noted by energy sector businesses that there 
is currently ‘considerable’ and ‘keen’ interest in ‘cleantech’ investments and a 
communications company specialising in harnessing social media for corporate customer 
service purposes that there was considerable interest, although valuations were lower than 
hoped for. One life science businesses stated that the market was “…good for later stage 
R&D where there is already a tradable technology platform.”  A recycling businesses also 
observed that it was “…better to be past the early R&D stage.”    
Nearly half (7 cases) of the recipient businesses had experienced difficulties in accessing 
finance. These tended to be start-ups and early stage R&D businesses across all sectors. 
The common view was that the process of finding and negotiating for early stage VC 
finance had become more difficult. Several managers mentioned experiencing more 
rigorous due diligence than previously and that the negotiations had taken longer, with 
valuations and offer amounts being lower than expected. Amongst these businesses the 
general feeling, as expressed by the CEO of a communications  start-up, was that: “It is 
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very tough to raise early stage R&D equity finance and that the process of finding and 
negotiating this is taking up to 12 months – twice as long as before the credit crunch.”                    
4.9 Additionality of UKIIF 
Only three surveyed UKIIF recipient business managers stated that they would definitely 
have proceeded at the same time and scale in their business development project, without 
UKIIF finance. However, even in these cases it was suggested that the UKIIF VC fund was 
the fund of choice, providing the best sectoral and investment stage match for the 
business and was most likely to enable the business to grow effectively. For example, a 
CEO of a communications company stated: “We could have used corporate VC finance, 
but this would not have provided us with the flexibility for our business development plan 
that we were looking for.”   
 
 
Note: n=16 
 
Three quarters would have been able to proceed, but the growth of the business would 
have been inhibited, either because it would have taken longer to find and negotiate to 
receive (44 per cent), or because the amount of finance on offer was likely to be less and 
result in a smaller scale project (56 per cent). In one case of a UK based advanced 
manufacturer, the UKIIF VC funding was the catalyst to receiving bank finance; “without 
this the project would not have gone ahead at all.”  
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Note: n=16 
 
More than two-thirds (69 per cent) of managers indicated that they would definitely have 
raised the finance required to go ahead with their project, even without UKIIF, with a 
quarter indicating that this was probable. This would imply deadweight but it is important to 
note that entrepreneurs may be overconfident in their ability to raise alternative sources of 
finance and so actual finance additionality figures may be higher than reported.  However, 
as mentioned above, for the majority of businesses, the absence of UKIIF could well have 
compromised their growth and development, either by slowing the process down by taking 
longer to find finance, or through being less suitable forms of finance. This latter point was 
expressed in two specific ways: first, in terms of the added value of the UKIIF VC fund 
managers, their hands on approach and understanding of the business (both stage of 
development and sector), which could spur and accelerate growth; second, in terms of the 
flexibility of approach that VC finance provided which was not as constrained as working 
with banks, fragmented groups of business angels, or corporate investors which might lack 
drive, knowledge of the sector, or seek to impose specific business development models 
(i.e. through the corporate VC route). This may be especially important for innovative high 
growth potential businesses where flexibility in funding and speed to market are important 
factors. 
 
4.9.1 Barriers and problems associated with alternative sources of finance 
In most cases alternative sources of finance, such as other private VCs, corporate VCs, 
banks and mezzanine finance and business angels, were not perceived as perfect 
substitutes. Several interviewed managers complained about the length of time taken to 
find and negotiate with groups of business angels and that collectively this could be 
considerably more expensive (both in terms of cost of negotiations and share of equity 
given away) than using a single private VC, whilst bank and mezzanine finance could be 
just as expensive as private VC equity finance, involve rigidly restrictive terms and 
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conditions and lack specialist management expertise which VC fund managers are able to 
provide. As the CEO of a recycling business stated: 
“We could have received the same amount of funding elsewhere, but it is more about 
suitability and getting the right chemistry and understanding of the business goals and 
sector.” 
Whilst most businesses would have found alternative sources of finance, surveyed 
managers suggested a variety of reasons why this was problematic: 
“The main difficulty would be in speed of business development and adopting our 
innovative business model, which may not have been right for corporate investors.” CEO 
of a communications company. 
“The main issue with the alternative mezzanine finance on offer was that it did not have as 
much expertise in early stage R&D and life science contacts.”  Life science company CEO. 
“There were several other private VC offers, but they were less good valuations and would 
have offered at best, half a million less in funding.”  Communications business CEO.  
“The alternative was angel finance which was taking time and would have required more 
equity and may not have been as sustainable in terms of expanding finance to enable 
rapid business growth – it would have held back the business.”  Chairman of an energy 
sector business. 
“Actually bank finance would have been less expensive, but not as flexible for our rapid 
growth needs.” Life science business CEO. 
“Without the [UKIIF] finance we would have been £5m short of our project target.  There 
would have been time delays, more pitching, due diligence, negotiations and legal fees, 
with angels or private VCs.”  Communications business CEO. 
“Other angel funding or private equity would most likely have taken longer to find and 
would have meant outsourcing our IT R&D abroad to India, which would have taken longer 
and been more difficult to manage.”  Communications business CEO. 
“It would have taken longer to get the same amount of finance and it would be unlikely to 
find a lead investor to drive the process as well. Our [UKIIF] VC has undertaken a great 
deal of preparatory work for us in negotiating licensing and enabling the spin-out to take 
place at all.”   Life science business CEO. 
 
4.9.2 Introduction of innovation to the UK market 
Seven of the surveyed UKIIF recipient businesses are currently trading in the UK market. 
All of them are offering totally new and innovative services to the UK market. These 
include energy control and efficiency devices, developing greater and more effective use 
of renewable energies, labour and time saving aerial surveillance for the oil and gas 
industry, IT to adapt social media for more effective customer service usage, real time 
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solutions to monitoring stock market trading activities and cancer drug testing services. 
These are all market leading activities in the UK and are mainly complementary and 
additional to existing services, or will replace outmoded time consuming and more labour 
intensive approaches. The remaining six UK owned and based recipient businesses are all 
likely to introduce similarly highly innovative products and services to the UK market within 
the next three years. Of the remaining three overseas companies, only one currently 
trades in the UK, whilst the other two are unlikely to do so. The overseas recycling waste 
management company that is currently trading in the UK provides globally leading edge 
tracking and control devices for the industry and has recently acquired a UK based IT 
software writing company to assist with further R&D.  
Overall, there would appear to be a considerable net gain from the innovative outputs of 
these companies and whilst they may result in some loss of labour due to automation, they 
appear to offer efficiencies to existing technologies and are complementary to the UK 
market, rather than duplicating existing activity.   
 
4.9.3 Non financial benefits of underlying UKIIF VC fund managers          
Virtually all of the surveyed managers of the UKIIF recipient businesses were very positive 
about the additional input received from their UKIIF fund managers. As already indicated, 
the UKIIF VCs were invariably the ‘fund of choice’ because they were perceived as ideal 
for the sector and stage of business development. Although for some of the interviewed 
managers it was still very early to tell whether the relationship with their fund managers 
would develop as they hoped, there was very positive feedback.  
In all cases the UKIIF VC fund has representation on the board and in several cases this 
includes Non Executive Director status and assistance with key appointments to 
strengthen the board and management team, such as finance directors and NED 
Chairmen. There was a general consensus that the commercially driven private VC 
approach helps to install rigorous business monitoring and financial management. As one 
recycling business CEO mentioned, “…we thought we knew how to run our business, but 
now we understand it a lot better!”  This approach, which “…tests and challenges the 
management team”, helps to drive the business to greater success. A couple of managers 
were critical of this, suggesting that private VCs could be short-sighted, with relatively 
short-term objectives, and do not always act in the best interests of the business as a 
whole, but on balance the vast majority were enthusiastic and wanted to be challenged. It 
should be recognised that the VCs appear to work hard alongside these businesses, 
offering regular contact (e.g. once or twice a week) in terms of providing a ‘sounding 
board’ for ideas and at monthly or bi-monthly board meetings when the VCs attend and 
time is taken to really get to know the managers.  
The UKIIF underlying VC fund managers were highly commended by the recipient 
businesses in the majority of cases for their additional inputs into the business. Key 
aspects of this included: helping to find and negotiate with prospective customers, often in 
overseas markets with very large companies involving complex and daunting negotiations 
and legal issues; assistance with tackling regulatory and licensing issues, particularly in 
the life science sector; using networking contacts to bring in specialist consultants to assist 
with business development e.g. sales and marketing; assistance with business strategy 
and acquisition and assistance with finding additional external finance.  
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Sectoral knowledge and understanding of the business development stage were described 
as ‘huge’ and ‘massive’ advantages and as one CEO summarily stated: 
“The [UKIIF] VC had the right chemistry, understood the technical issues and the market, 
coming from a cleantech background. The fund manager could add real value to the 
business, understanding the company and its goals.” 
 4.10 Overall rating of UKIIF VC 
 
Note: n=16 
 
The satisfaction rating from the surveyed managers of the recipient UKIIF businesses was 
very high, with virtually all rating the value of the VC investment received as ‘very good’. 
Similarly 15 out of the 16 cases would definitely recommend UKIIF VCs to other 
businesses in similar circumstances to themselves.  
However, five recipient business managers made suggestions for improving the underlying 
UKIIF VCs. These included: ensuring that start-ups are able to obtain funding, as the 
UKIIF VC fund that this company used was not technically supposed to fund start-ups 
within its investment strategy; that the level of due diligence required for first round R&D 
investment had been unnecessarily detailed; complaint from a communications business 
that their VC was not sufficiently knowledgeable about their sector; complaints from two 
businesses that their VCs were not strategic enough with regard to the medium to longer 
term development of the business and needed to take on board the wider interests of the 
other shareholders.  
Additionally there were several criticisms of the UK banking sector which was felt to be 
totally inadequate in assisting innovative UK owned and based companies, even after 
UKIIF VC finance had been secured and the prospects for business growth are excellent. 
For example, a start-up energy sector business with sales turnover doubling year on year 
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and operating at a £3m profit within one year of starting trading, is still experiencing 
problems raising a few thousand pounds in bank finance to purchase equipment.  
Overall, the positive comments reported far outweighed the negative comments and for 
each case where there has been a criticism there are several cases where there have 
been glowing endorsements. For example a major strength of the UKIIF VCs is 
undoubtedly that they are perceived as leading private VCs in the sectors that they 
operate and do offer highly specialised sectoral expertise and strategic management 
insight into operating in these sectors. 
4.11 Timescale to exit 
Although it is too early to observe any actual fund exits, the managers of the UKIIF 
recipient businesses were asked how long they expected to take from the time of initial 
funding through to exiting the fund and what process this was likely to take.  
The average length of time from receiving the initial UKIIF finance to exiting the investment 
is forecast at four years (median 4 years), with a range of between one and seven years.  
Table 4.10: Forecast UKIIF investment period  
 Years 
Average 4 
Median 4 
Range 1 to 7 years 
 
 
The most frequently mentioned fund exit strategy is via a trade sale for over one third of 
businesses (6 cases), with one quarter mentioning IPOs, and large VC funding rounds 
which would involve pharmaceutical companies, corporate and institutional VCs for later 
stage commercialisation and major step business growth (Figure 4.10). Two surveyed 
managers specifically mentioned that they were keen to retain ownership and would seek 
MBOs.  It is important to recognise that these are the views of the businesses themselves, 
which may differ from those of the underlying fund managers. 
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Note: multiple answers were provided in some cases 
 
There were some concerns, particularly amongst the surveyed managers seeking MBOs, 
that they wanted to keep the business in the UK and where possible to remain in charge. 
One energy sector CEO gave the following statement in terms of how this might be 
achieved:  
 “I’m not keen to sell out the business and will seek ways to merge, acquire and license 
growth in order to buyout investors and retain this as a UK business, where possible. 
Unfortunately, in my view, the most likely next stage investors will be overseas, Middle 
East or Far East based, but I wish to avoid selling out to an overseas company. The UK 
government should do more to help us to grow and remain a UK company.”  
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5. CONCLUDING LESSONS  
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this concluding section the key findings from the supply-side interviews with fund of 
funds managers, the underlying fund managers and key market stakeholders are 
integrated with the findings from the 16 surveyed UKIIF recipient businesses in order to 
address the key research questions and provide key lessons and possible challenges for 
the scheme. 
 
5.2 UKIIF is seen as addressing a funding gap in the UK and 
European VC market affecting innovative technology 
businesses, particularly at the £2-5 million level of investment. 
There may be some displacement from using the EIF’s 
matched funds. 
 
5.2.1 Positive Lessons 
 UKIIF was established quickly to address a shortfall in early stage equity finance for 
high technology R&D in the UK and Europe in 2009. It has been effective in 
providing finance to these companies, and is still required in current market 
conditions.  
 UKIIF has been particularly effective in raising private equity in early stage 
technology funds in a period of severely adverse conditions for private investment.  
 Investment into early stage R&D, above the current EU state aid limit, of between 
£2-5 million has been particularly beneficial to companies that may otherwise be 
constrained.  
 
5.2.2 Challenges 
 The rapid establishment of UKIIF may not have enabled as widespread private 
investment as could have been the case if a longer establishment period was 
allowed. 
 There may be displacement effect from using EIF as a fund of funds manager, 
given that these matched funds would have existed in the UK anyway. 
 There is a high percentage (up to 55 per cent) of overseas businesses within the 
underlying UKIIF portfolio. 
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5.3 The fund of funds model has attracted significant private 
sector funding and has wide market scope, but the double 
layer of fees and less control over underlying fund investment 
is a key challenge for a fund of funds model. 
 
5.3.1 Positive Lessons 
 UKIIF has been well received in the UK and Europe, encouraging private 
investment leverage and investment diversification through effective fund of funds 
management. 
 There is a substantial amount of private sector leverage, although some of it may 
not be additional. 
 
5.3.2 Challenges 
 The double layer of fund fee charges and lesser control over underlying fund 
investment activity are potential concerns from using a fund of funds model 
compared to investing directly into VC funds. 
 
 
5.4 The UKIIF appears to be funding high growth potential 
businesses using globally leading technology within its target 
sectors, with the vast majority likely to become exporters. 
Funded businesses are across the UK, but there is some 
concentration in Scotland, London and the South/East of 
England. 
 
5.4.1 Positive Lessons 
 The UKIIF seems to be meeting its targets for providing early stage R&D finance to 
UK businesses in the clean technology and life science sectors. 
 The UKIIF is funding highly innovative global leading edge product/service 
development.  
 At least four fifths of UK recipient businesses will export. 
 
5.4.2 Challenges 
 Although there are no geographic restrictions, there is a concentration of investment 
going to UK businesses in the London and the South/East of England in line with 
the wider VC market. This may reflect where innovative businesses and key 
university research institutions are located in the UK. 
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5.5 The vast majority of recipient businesses are satisfied with 
using underlying UKIIF funds and value the assistance given 
by fund managers, although it remains difficult for firms with 
less experience of VC finance to find the underlying funds. 
 
5.5.1 Positive Lessons 
 Selected underlying VC funds specialising in target technology sectors are highly 
rated by recipient businesses as market leading ‘funds of choice’.    
 Overall, recipient businesses report very high satisfaction rates for their underlying 
fund managers. 
 
5.5.2 Challenges 
 The limited promotion of the UKIIF underlying fund managers makes it difficult for 
businesses with inexperienced managers to find these funds, without NED or VC 
finder assistance. 
 Recipient businesses indicated that the time to find and negotiate early stage R&D 
equity finance had increased, approximately doubling from six to twelve months, 
since the onset of the current financial crisis. 
 
5.6 Although many recipient businesses perceive that they 
would have been able to raise finance in the absence of the 
fund, it would have taken a lot longer and impacted on 
business performance, considerably slowing their 
development. 
 
5.6.1 Positive Lessons 
 The UKIIF supported underlying funds had invested a substantial amount of funding 
into innovative technology businesses, which has leveraged additional funding. 
 The UKIIF VCs offer considerable added value through their ‘hands on’ approach to 
management.  
 
5.6.2 Challenges 
 The UKIIF’s additionality is partial, since at least two thirds of recipients claim that 
they would definitely have raised the finance required. However, in all but three 
cases (81 per cent), business performance would have been compromised without 
the UKIIF funding.   
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5.7 Recipient businesses have shown growth and appear to 
have a strong potential for future growth, with underlying 
funds contributing highly and disproportionately to this.  
 
5.7.1 Positive Lessons 
 The UKIIF’s overall impact on recipient businesses’ development appears greater 
than its investment level. 
 More than one third (6) are currently performing better than expected, and only two 
cases are underperforming. 
 
5.8 UKIIF is also facilitating innovation spill over effects in the 
UK’s university and R&D base, generating net new jobs to the 
economy, with little sign of duplication or displacement. 
 
5.8.1 Positive Lessons 
 UKIIF is harnessing and developing the UK’s university and R&D base. For the 
recipient businesses innovation is closely linked to external collaborations and spin 
outs from sector R&D specialists, acquisitions and universities and through KTPs 
and FP7 projects. 
 UKIIF is generating net new jobs to the UK economy, improving business 
efficiencies and reducing carbon footprints. 
 Since there are few competitors, the UKIIF recipient businesses trading in the UK 
appear to be offering complementary products and services, rather than duplicating 
and displacing existing activities. 
 
5.8.2 Challenges 
 Some UKIIF efficiencies may lead to automation and job losses, but more efficient 
redeployment of existing labour in many cases is more likely.  
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5.9 UKIIF is providing support for life sciences and a low 
carbon economy, developing global leading edge health 
improvements and technology that offers the potential to lower 
carbon footprints. Concerns were raised over the UK’s strict 
drugs development regulations and changes in green 
subsidies. 
 
5.9.1 Positive Lessons 
 The majority of recipient businesses will introduce efficiencies and offer technology 
or ways to considerably lower the UK’s carbon footprint. Two thirds (11) of recipient 
business will reduce carbon use and costs, almost half (7) save energy, one quarter 
(4) improve recycling, and almost one fifth (3) improve health.  
 Global leading edge life science businesses are being assisted, which should 
improve health and reduce medical costs in the longer term.  
 
5.9.2 Challenges 
 The lower finance leverage rates shown in the underlying life science funds, when 
compared to cleantech, would appear to follow recent trends where life sciences 
have experienced a dip in UK investment (Crocker, 2011; OBN, 2011), whilst clean 
technology, energy and IT investments have been more buoyant, particularly due to 
government ‘Green Deal’ type policies (McIvor, 2011; PEW Trust, 2010).  
 Some concerns have been raised as to whether some portfolio businesses will 
survive when government cleantech subsidies are reduced. Recent changes to the 
Green Energy Tariff were viewed as disruptive to the sector’s overall development 
at the current time. Questions were also raised as to how UKIIF will relate to the 
Green Investment Bank and IFC Climate Catalyst Fund. 
 The current very strict UK drug development regulations were perceived as a 
negative factor within the UK life sciences sector. 
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5.10 Although too early to assess actual performance, the 
UKIIF has the potential for good economic and financial 
performance, particularly if exiting in an economic up-turn. 
Concerns were raised about keeping businesses in the UK 
after UKIIF exit. 
 
5.10.1 Positive Lessons 
 Full realisation is not likely until well beyond 2020 (up to 12 years on from fund closure).  
 It is perceived that currently is a good time in the economic cycle to make investments in 
tech companies due to more realistic valuations, lower costs and less competition. 
 UKIIF recipient businesses fund exit timescale ranged from 1-7 years, averaging 4 years. 
 
5.10.2 Future Challenges 
 There are some concerns regarding keeping businesses within the UK after trade 
sales and next stage VC investments.   
 There are concerns that exits might be problematic if the economy remains 
depressed or slips back into recession. 
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CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
This section presents five case studies which have been selected in order to illustrate a 
range of examples of businesses receiving equity funding from the UKIIF. UKIIF’s two fund 
of funds; Hermes GPE’s Environmental Innovation Fund and European Investment Fund’s 
UK Future Technologies Fund and two underlying funds for each of the fund of funds are 
represented by the case studies.    
The cases include examples from UKIIF’s different target sectors and four specialist 
underlying funds: two life sciences (representing two different underlying funds), one 
advanced manufacturing, one clean technology, and one digital technology. They also 
include examples of start-up and early stage R&D, as well as later stage development and 
commercialisation. All of the cases exhibit exceptional levels of innovation, whereby they 
are providing leading edge technologies and services in the UK market and in some cases 
globally. Whilst all of the cases selected have tremendous potential for growth in the 
future, there are already several of these cases where exceptional growth has been 
experienced, even within the two years of receiving UKIIF funding.   
Hermes GPE’s Environmental Innovation Fund cases: 
Case Study 1:  Petainer - Advanced Manufacturing 
Case 
Business Profile 
An advanced plastics manufacturing company, trading for two years, located 
in the East of England, currently employing 250 people, developing innovative 
lightweight plastics for the liquid container industry.  
Innovation 
The CEO described their activity as “…state of the art, cutting edge, from the 
R&D to the manufacturing processes and services offered.”  “Game changing 
technology” in manufacturing processes has improved recycling, producing 
stronger, lightweight plastic containers, reducing plastics input by up to 85 per 
cent and transport costs by 30 per cent. One of their global market leading 
products is a plastic beer keg, which is more environmentally friendly, cheaper 
and lighter than conventional steel kegs and is opening up opportunities for 
beer exports to the Eastern European markets, using non returnable, 
recyclable kegs.   
Innovation has been stimulated by three years of competition funding offered 
by the company which has led to successful collaborations with both 
Birmingham and De Montfort Universities; the former has been a participant in 
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the Petainer international design awards and the latter design engineering 
team is working closely with the company on a number of significant projects, 
as well as the development of a strong in-house R&D team. 
Reason for Seeking Finance 
The company was seeking a package of equity and bank finance in order to 
fund a management buy-in to an existing UK-based business and undertake 
internal R&D to commercialise technology. Total project cost was around 
£13m, of which the UKIIF underlying fund provided just under £3m.  
The business searched for funding for nearly three years, and was hampered 
by the lack of bank finance available in the UK and Europe. Equity finance 
was found using an accountancy group, and was not problematic, taking nine 
months to find and negotiate. Getting a UKIIF underlying VC on board as lead 
investor was a catalyst to getting further VC investment from private sector 
funds and obtaining European bank finance.  
Early Impacts of Investment 
UKIIF equity, received almost two years ago, is described as “…critical to 
business development, transforming the business into a global market leader 
in new market segments.” Sales turnover has nearly doubled since funding to 
almost £100m and is forecast to increase over the next two years to at least 
£120m. Employment has increased by 18 full-time staff and is set to increase 
by a further 100 staff by 2014. UK manufacturing growth will be part of this 
growth, with over 90 per cent of trade in exports. 
Additionality 
Without UKIIF the owners would not have been able to undertake the 
Management Buy-In which started the current company.  The UKIIF 
underlying VC is described as “...massively helpful, providing a strong steer 
on corporate finance and governance and constructive input at all times. They 
have been particularly helpful in finding new overseas customers.” 
 
 
Case Study 2: Anesco – Clean Technology, Rapid 
Growth Start-Up Case 
Business Profile 
An energy efficiency company, which started trading in December 2010, 
providing a one-stop solution service for commercial customers and HNW 
individuals, for using all forms of renewable energy, focusing solely on the UK 
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market. The company currently has 75 full-time employees and 120 on short 
term contracts and is based in the South of England.  
Innovation 
The first company in the UK offering total energy solutions, following leading 
North American and German company models, mainly serving the larger 
commercial business market as well as large social housing providers, 
provide consultancy and advice on a full range of renewable solutions. The 
company offers initial concept, R&D, monitoring, financing and all technical 
solutions and have patented their own energy monitoring devices, developed 
in-house through strategic company acquisition and key staff recruitment. The 
products and services offered by the company will help contribute to reducing 
UK carbon emissions. 
Reason for Seeking Finance 
UKIIF equity finance was required in order to start-up the business, acquire 
through a Management Buy-In of an existing UK business with technical 
expertise, fund R&D for energy monitoring toolkit development and provide 
working capital. There was considerable interest from other investors, but the 
UKIIF underlying fund was selected as the lead investor because the CEO 
had developed a professional relationship with the fund’s Managing Partner  
and knew “…the fund’s excellent track record in developing cleantechs.”  
The UKIIF lead funding of £3m was secured within one month, along with 
matching funding of £3m from a corporate FTSE 50 company. 
Early Impacts of Investment 
In just over a year the company has started trading, growing from 12 to 193 
staff, with sales turnover of £21.5m and is already generating a net profit of 
nearly £1m. Within three years, the business is expected to generate sales in 
excess of £100m and have at least 250 full time staff. At that stage they 
expect to exit UKIIF via other VC funds in the short term and ultimately a trade 
buyer in the next 5 years, which could range from a utility to a large 
construction company looking to enter the green sector.  
Additionality 
Whilst the CEO acknowledges that other equity funding was available, the 
UKIIF underlying fund was their first choice: “I trust them as a leading growth 
investor in the cleantech field. The fund manager knows and understands the 
sector and provides an excellent sounding board for day to day management 
decisions.”  
 
68 
 
Early Assessment of the UK Innovation Investment Fund 
European Investment Fund’s UK Future Technologies Fund cases: 
Case Study 3: Horizon Discovery - Life Sciences, Later 
Stage Case 
Business Profile 
Horizon Discovery Limited is a life science company that began trading in July 
2007, providing leading edge research tools for decoding the human genome 
and accelerating discovery of personalised cancer medicines. The company is 
experiencing rapid export growth into developed countries. It currently has 70 
full-time staff and is based in Cambridge, UK.   
Innovation Proposition 
The company was founded to commercialise pioneering gene-editing 
technology invented by Professor David Russell at the University of 
Washington and developed by Horizon Discovery’s scientific co-founders at 
the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Torino Medical School.  
Seed funding was provided by Cambridge University and Cambridge 
University Alumni.  Horizon Discovery gained exclusive control of the patent 
estate underpinning the technology and has since use the gene editing 
technique to develop 400 X-MAN™ cell lines, the world’s first source of 
genetically-defined and patient-relevant human cell lines, accurately modelling 
the disease-causing mutations found in cancer patients. These ‘patients-in-a-
test-tube’ are being used by academic and industry leaders to identify the 
effect of individual or compound genetic mutations on drug activity, patient 
responsiveness, and resistance, leading to reduced drug development costs, 
time-lines and failure rates for drug developers. This will lead to better clinical 
outcomes for patients, and increased value for money for tax payers. 
In addition, Horizon provides derived products and services with industrial 
applications in bio-pharmaceutical process optimisation, clinical diagnostic 
development, drug discovery and development, and the provision of reference 
standards for genomic-based clinical research platforms. 
 
Reason for Seeking Finance 
In 2010, the company was seeking third-round equity or bank finance to fund 
a rapid expansion of the business to meet a growing demand for its 
commercial offering, and support the management team’s goal to build a long-
term sustainable business rather than seek an early-exit. Two further rounds 
of financing, totalling £11.25m, were secured from an investment consortium 
led by DFJ Esprit LLP, MVM Life Sciences LLP, and existing investors, within 
a 12 month period. The UKIIF, an underlying funder of DFJ Esprit LLP, 
provided an ideal source of investment as the CEO of Horizon was familiar 
with the fund, enabling them to be secured as lead investor after a more rapid 
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than usual period of four months negotiations and due diligence.   
Early Impacts of Investment 
The business has expanded rapidly since UKIIF funding, adding 46 full-time 
staff in less than two years. Moreover, sales have doubled to over £4.2m and 
forecast to increase by 100% over the next twelve months, leading to 
profitability. This outstanding performance has led to the company in 2012 
being named Business Weekly’s Business of the Year, and receiving a 
Queen’s Award for Enterprise in International Trade. Within the next three 
years the business is expected to employ 130 and achieve sales in excess of 
£20m, with exports representing over 90 per cent of trade. At this stage a UK 
market IPO would be the preferred exit for UKIIF. 
What the company says 
“Through its investment in DFJ Esprit LLP, the UKIIF VC has played an 
invaluable role in the development of our company. Having succeeded in the 
implementation of Phase I of our business plan it was important to find an 
investor with a 10 year outlook on its funding strategy. DFJ Esprit has 
provided experience, diligence and management support to the senior 
executives and board of directors and, most importantly, has backed its 
aspiration to build a world-leading UK Life Science company.” Dr Darrin M 
Disley, CEO. 
 
 
Case Study 4: Aveillant - Digital Technology, Start-Up 
Case 
Business Profile 
An advanced digital technology business, established in 2011 and due to start 
commercial sales in 2013. They are currently developing a commercial 3-D 
holographic radar product which will enable wind farms to locate closer to 
airports. The company currently has eight full-time employees and is located 
in the East of England.     
Innovation 
This is a novel use of 3-D holographic radar technology spun out from 
Cambridge Consultants Ltd, where it was originally developed for a military 
application. The concept is to provide advanced radar technology coverage to 
enable wind farms to locate safely within the current airport radar exclusion 
zones.  This would currently allow 6GW of prospective UK wind farms to get 
through planning, doubling current UK capacity and reducing the UK’s carbon 
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emissions.       
Reason for Seeking Finance 
The company was seeking first round start-up equity funding for an initial 
project cost of £2.1m. The UKIIF underlying VC was the first choice fund, as it 
was known to the company as “…a leading digital technology start-up fund, 
with a first class track record.”  Equity funding of £0.8m was secured from the 
UKIIF underlying VC together with £0.8m from Cambridge Consultants after a 
lengthy period of over six months of due diligence and contract negotiations. 
A £0.5m loan was also obtained from an industry organisation in 2011. A 
second round of £4m equity finance will be raised in late 2012 to enable 
commercial roll-out and manufacturing. The UKIIF underlying fund is expected 
to provide a proportion of this funding and assist with introducing additional 
VC investors. 
Early Impacts of Investment 
The business is on-track to generate revenues in 2013, with employment set 
to rise to around 20 staff in that year and in three years time to around 50 full-
time staff, when the business is expected to move into profitability. The 
company’s CEO stated: “The business model will lead to servicing of on-site 
radar stations for wind farms and the company will seek to provide an exit for 
the UKIIF underlying fund through an IPO or trade sale within the next five 
years.” 
Additionality 
“The expertise and flexibility of using a VC investor with early stage business 
development experience is invaluable, suits our business development model, 
and considerably increases our chances of obtaining further finance.”  CEO of 
Aveillant. 
 
 
Case Study 5: CN Creative - Life Sciences, Early Stage 
Case 
Business Profile 
A healthcare business originally established in 2008 to create and develop  
products and services for the millions of concerned smokers who have not 
been able to stop smoking, aimed at smoking cessation and harm reduction. 
The initial success of the product through on-line sales in 26 countries led to 
an aim to develop a specific product, ‘Intellicig’ – an electronic cigarette, in-
house to meet strict UK medical regulations. This business located in the 
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North West currently employs 45 full-time staff. 
Innovation 
The substitute smoking product is unique to the UK market and the R&D 
adjustments being incorporated to meet UK medical regulations will make this 
a leading edge smoking cessation/harm reduction treatment, both in the UK 
and overseas. This will have wider health benefits to society by enabling more 
people to reduce/give up smoking. 
Reason for Seeking Finance 
Equity finance was required in order to undertake R&D to achieve UK medical 
regulatory approval. This was first round finance for a project cost of £4m, 
with UKIIF providing £2m equity in two annual tranches with the remainder 
funded out of business profits.  The UKIIF underlying fund was sourced 
through a VC finder and was selected over a mezzanine option because 
“…the VC had superior early stage UK medical market knowledge.” 
Preparation for VC applications took three months followed by another three 
months of due diligence and contract negotiations.   
Early Impacts of Investment 
The business is not currently in profit, as it is investing heavily into R&D, but 
expects to be in profit within the next year (two years after initial funding) and 
to have more than doubled sales turnover to £2.5m at this stage, with 
employment increasing from 30 full-time staff at the time of funding to 80 full-
time staff. Within three years the business is forecasting net annual profit of 
over £20m and to employ 150 full-time staff. At this stage the business will be 
seeking further equity investment from US VCs who can assist with 
commercialisation and exports into the US market.     
Additionality 
The CEO currently attributes almost all of the company’s development to the 
underlying UKIIF VC. “Their management guidance is vital to our business 
growth and development and also, very importantly, they have been able to 
source key consultant contacts to help steer us through the UK clinical 
regulations work, providing absolutely invaluable assistance.”  However, they 
will require a different VC, with later stage expertise, to guide them through 
the next growth stage in commercialisation and export to the US. 
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